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Introduction
Determining when private conduct is state action and thus subject
to the Fourteenth Amendment has long been one of the most trouble-
some issues in constitutional law. Indeed, nearly every article about the
state action doctrine published in the last twenty years quotes and con-
curs with Professor Charles Black's characterization of the doctrine as "a
conceptual disaster area."1 The Supreme Court's failure to construct a
coherent state action doctrine is partly attributable, of course, to changes
in the Court's membership. The Court's votes on state action cases are
volatile, and the outcome of state action cases can change with relatively
small changes in the Court's membership.2 President Reagan's reshaping
of the Court, therefore, is likely to have a great impact on the Court's
1. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Forward: "State Action," Equal Protection,
and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967); see, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1690 (2d ed. 1988); Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80
Nw. U.L. REV. 503, 504 (1985); Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The "Government Func-
tion" and "Power Theory" Approaches, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 757, 757; Friendly, The Public-
Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289, 1290-91 (1982); Phillips,
The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 683, 683
(1984); Rowe, The Emerging Threshold Approach to State Action Determinations: Trying to
Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEo. L.J. 745, 745 (1981); Schneider, The
1982 State Action Trilogy: Doctrinal Contraction, Confusion, and a Proposal for Change, 60
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1150, 1150 (1985).
2. The divergent approaches of the Vinson and Warren Courts on the one hand, and the
Burger Court on the other, demonstrate the impact that changes in Justices can have on this
issue. The Warren Court's state action decisions devised new theories by which to apply the
Equal Protection Clause to ostensibly private conduct and broadened the application of ex-
isting theories. In contrast, the Burger Court restricted state action theories, making it much
more difficult for a court to find state action. See, e.g., Burke & Reber, State Action, Congres-
sional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1003, 1041 n.133 (1973) (the addition of Justices Rehnquist and Powell changed a mi-
state action doctrine.3
Despite the "conservative" majority created by President Reagan's
appointments,4 however, the direction that the Rehnquist Court5 will
take in shaping the state action doctrine is unclear. As one might expect,
the Rehnquist Court's decisions reflect some inclination to continue the
Burger Court's restriction of the state action doctrine. This tendency is
most notably illustrated in the opinions and votes of Chief Justice Rehn-
quist.6 Yet the Court's state action decisions also reflect movement, even
among Reagan appointees, toward a broader state action doctrine. This
movement is evident in Justice O'Connor's opinions.7 The chaos of the
nority position on state action issues into a solid and reliable six vote majority); Schneider,
supra note 1, at 1152.
Because legal doctrine constrains new Justices' freedom, changes in the Supreme Court's
membership do not result ordinarily in unbounded changes in law. See generally Schauer,
Does Doctrine Matter?, 82 MICH. L. REv. 655 (1984). Doctrinal limits are less constrictive in
state action decisions, however, because no settled doctrine ever emerged. The precedents are
so varied and even contradictory that a new Justice can easily find sound Supreme Court
precedent to support almost any state action decision.
3. President Reagan had tremendous influence on the Court not only because he ap-
pointed three Justices (four if one counts Chief Justice Rehnquist), but also because his admin-
istration went to great lengths to assure the appointment of Justices with political views similar
to the President's.
4. See Howard, Living with the Warren Legacy, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 69 (Professor
Howard notes that Justice Kennedy's first full term on the Court marked the emergence of a
conservative "working majority," the Court's first in over twenty years.).
5. Using the identity of the Chief Justice to demarcate periods of Supreme Court history
is a common but usually arbitrary "expedient," because the appointment of a new Chief Jus-
tice alone seldom causes major shifts in the Court's legal doctrine. See V. BLASI, THE BURGER
COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T xi (1983); see also Schauer, supra note
2. Referring to the "state action decisions of the Rehnquist Court," however, is coincidentally
appropriate. Prior to Justice Rehnquist's becoming Chief Justice in 1986, the last major state
action decision was in 1982. The Court actually rendered three important state action deci-
sions on the same date in 1982: Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Edmonson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (Lugar actually was more important as an interpretation of the
"under color of law" requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)); and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830 (1982). Following Justice Rehnquist's appointment as Chief Justice, the Court
rendered four significant state action decisions in two years. Moreover, the Court's member-
ship changed significantly between those two groups of state action decisions. Justice Scalia,
replacing Chief Justice Burger, participated in all four of the 1987 and 1988 state action deci-
sions. Justice Kennedy, replacing Justice Powell, participated in three. Although Justice
O'Connor participated in the 1982 state action trilogy, she was in her first term on the Court
and had not participated in the many earlier Burger Court state action decisions that shaped
state action doctrine. With these three Reagan appointees and a new Chief Justice, therefore,
the Court that decided the 1987 and 1988 state action cases had significantly different member-
ship from the Courts that decided even recent state action cases.
6. See infra notes 349-381 and accompanying text. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist
authored many of the opinions discussed in this Article while still an Associate Justice, for the
sake of consistency, he will be referred to throughout as Chief Justice Rehnquist.
7. See infra notes 425-36 and accompanying text. Other members of the Court also have
demonstrated an inclination to broaden the Burger Court's restrictive version of the state ac-
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state action precedent is thus compounded by conflicting trends in the
present Court.
This Article seeks to identify and define the different models of state
action doctrine embraced by various members of the Court and to ana-
lyze the impact of those models on state action jurisprudence. The Arti-
cle begins in Part I by examining the origins of the state action doctrine
and the purposes it serves in the structure of the Constitution. Part II of
the Article reviews and analyzes the state action theories developed and
refined by the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts8 by which courts ap-
ply fourteenth amendment restrictions to ostensibly private conduct.
Part III summarizes the Rehnquist Court's recent state action cases,
and Part IV identifies three models of state action theory evident in those
opinions and analyzes their impact on state action jurisprudence. Most
of the present Justices, it finds, adhere to a state action doctrine that is
more liberal than the doctrine espoused by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
embraced by the Burger Court. It finds that the present Justices increas-
ingly adhere to the O'Connor model of state action, which applies a lib-
eral "joint participation" theory to find state action in a variety of
circumstances. 9
Part V concludes that the approach most consistent with the pur-
pose of the Constitution and the state action doctrine is a merger of all
three models. It concludes that the Rehnquist model, while the most
accurate in pursuing the purpose of the Constitution and the state action
doctrine, is unduly restrictive in some respects. The O'Connor model,
while justifiably seeking to expand the Rehnquist model, does so in a
manner that lacks useable standards and that creates excessive regulation
of private conduct by the federal judiciary. A better approach is to mod-
ify the Rehnquist model, not with the O'Connor joint participation the-
ory, but with a limited and controlled version of the Marshall model.
That is, expand the Rehnquist model by including a "delegation" variant
of the government function theory that is more flexible and less restric-
tive than Chief Justice Rehnquist's but more disciplined than Justice
Marshall's. 1o
tion doctrine, but Justice O'Connor more consistently embraces such an expansion. See infra
note 427.
8. The Court first addressed the state action doctrine in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883), but most of the decisions that shaped its modem configuration came from the Vinson,
Warren, and Burger Courts after 1940.
9. See infra notes 425-61 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 484-88 and accompanying text.
I. The Basis and Function of the State Action Doctrine
A. Origin of the State Action Requirement
The central function of the United States Constitution is to provide
a framework for national republican self-governance.11 The Constitution
concerns itself almost exclusively with the creation of federal governmen-
tal bodies, the allocation of governmental power among those federal
bodies and the states, and the limitation of that governmental power at
both the state and federal level. As summarized by Professor Tribe, the
Constitution "controls the deployment of governmental power and de-
fines the rules for how such power may be structured and applied." 12
With one exception,13 the Constitution does not seek to govern or
regulate the affairs of individuals14 and private entities. 5 Having estab-
lished the branches of the federal government and having allocated gov-
ernmental power among those branches and the states, the Constitution
leaves the actual governing to the states and the federal bodies it created.
The Constitution simply creates the structure through which, and the
limits within which, these governmental bodies regulate the daily activi-
ties of individuals and define their rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis
their neighbors.' 6 These reciprocal rights and responsibilities among pri-
vate citizens (such as the "right" to exclude others from one's property
or the duty to refrain from taking another's property) owe their existence
to legislation and state common law-not to the United States Constitu-
tion. 17 In essence, the Constitution governs American governments-not
11. See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and
the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 94 (1966) ("constitutional law deals
chiefly with the conduct of the government").
12. L. TRIBE, Refocusing the State Action Inquiry, in CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 246
(1985).
13. Only the thirteenth amendment prohibition of slavery applies to private as distin-
guished from governmental action. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1688.
14. "Individuals" is used in this Article to refer to all nongovernmental entities, including
not only natural persons but also private corporations, associations, and other private entities.
15. R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 156 (2d ed. 1986); L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1688 & n.1; L.
TRIBE, supra note 12, at 246; Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notesfora Revised Opinion, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 473, 479 (1962).
16. See, eg., R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 156; L. TRIBE,
supra note 12, at 246.
17. See P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 129 (1962). State courts
and legislatures create these rights and responsibilities and directly regulate private conduct by
defining property interests, recognizing and providing relief for private causes of action, and
providing criminal sanctions for certain prohibited conduct. Id. at 129-30. The Constitution
does not concern itself with these private interests. Rather, it provides the structure and limits
within which governments can make decisions about them.
Professor Kauper has stated:
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Americans.18
Consistent with the function and purpose of the Constitution, the
individual "rights" and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution are, for
the most part, freedoms from certain kinds of governmental action. The
first eight Amendments apply, either expressly or impliedly, only to ac-
tions of the federal government.19 Similarly, the fourteenth amendment
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses expressly apply only to state
governments.20 Only the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery
directly restricts the actions of private citizens.21 With that exception,
the important constitutional liberties apply to and restrict only govern-
mental actions.22
State action, defined as conduct by any state or federal government,
is thus a requirement in any civil action seeking relief on the basis of
these constitutional guarantees.23 A litigant seeking the protection of
[Tihe limitations in the interest of the basic freedoms recognized by the Constitution
are directed against the government. The Constitution is concerned with constitu-
tional liberties in the classic sense of the Western world, i.e., as liberties of the indi-
vidual to be safeguarded against the power of the state. It is because the state enjoys
the monopoly of lawfully granted coercive power that restraints on its power are
recognized under the Constitution as the important conditions of liberty. The Con-
stitution, accordingly, is not concerned with direct restraints on the individual in the
interest of defining his duties and the reciprocal rights of his neighbors.
Civil rights as used in the sense that one person has a claim upon another, are
the product of common law and legislation-they furnish the staple of the private
law of contracts, torts, and property, and of a large and increasing body of public
statutory law, including the large mass of criminal law.
Id.
18. Professor Tribe thus characterizes constitutional law as "metalaw." L. TRIBE, supra
note 12, at 246.
19. The First Amendment, for example, does not guarantee that each individual will be
able to speak freely without interference from anyone. It more modestly guarantees that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... " U. S.
CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). Thus, if a private citizen physically prevents an individ-
ual from making a speech, the individual's constitutional freedom of speech is in no way vio-
lated. If, on the other hand, the federal, state, or even local government prevents the
individual from making the same speech, that governmental entity violates the First Amend-
ment. The first amendment right to freedom of speech, therefore, is only a "right" not to be
unreasonably silenced by the government.
20. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 488 U.S. 522,
542 (1987).
21. L. TRINE, supra note 1, at 1688.
22. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter
of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment."); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875)
("[T]he [F]ourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as
against another.").
23. Although the "state action" issue arises in actions against federal, state, and local
governments concerning various provisions of the Constitution, it most frequently arises in
these guarantees must establish that the allegedly unconstitutional con-
duct complained of "may fairly be said to be that of the [state]." '24 If the
conduct is not that of the state, then it cannot be unconstitutional-how-
ever wrongful it may be-because the Constitution applies only to state
action.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized this state action
requirement in its post-Civil War decisions construing the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment, rendering its most important early application
and analysis of the state action requirement in Civil Rights Cases.25 The
Court's decision in Civil Rights Cases arose from four criminal actions
and one civil action brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (the
Act).26 The defendants in each of the cases violated the Act by excluding
blacks from privately owned hotels, theatres, and railroads. The defend-
ants contended, however, that the Act was unconstitutional because it
was beyond the constitutional powers of Congress. The United States
and the private plaintiff argued, among other things, that the Act was
passed pursuant to Congress's powers under sections one and five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 27
The Supreme Court held that the defendants' discriminatory acts
did not violate section one of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus were
not subject to congressional regulation under section five, because their
actions did not constitute state action. The Court noted that section five
actions concerning the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the "rights" asserted by plaintiffs
vary in these different contexts, the state action doctrine does not. This Article, therefore,
generally refers to the state action issue as it relates to the fourteenth amendment limitations
on state government, but the state action issue and doctrine apply equally to other constitu-
tional guarantees and to other governments. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 488 U.S. 522
(applies the state action doctrine to determine if the federal government is responsible for the
actions of the United States Olympic Committee such that the Committee's activities are state
action subject to the Fifth Amendment).
24. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
25. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court addressed the issue earlier but in less depth in United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 637-38 (1883), Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880),
and Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554-55.
26. The Act provided criminal and civil sanctions against any person who was denied
"full and equal enjoyment" of various public facilities and conveyances on the basis of race.
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, 336 chap. 114.
27. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this Article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
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of the Amendment gives Congress power only to enforce the Amend-
ment's other provisions.2" Congress had power to punish the defendants,
therefore, only if their conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment it-
self. The Court then examined section one of the Amendment, which the
Act purported to enforce. Noting that the provision is "prohibitory upon
the States," the Court stated:
It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of
the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and
makes void all State legislation, and State action of every kind,
which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property
without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the
equal protection of the laws.29
The defendants' exclusion of blacks from their facilities, the Court held,
did not violate section one of the Amendment because it was not done
pursuant to state law or under state authority.30
B. The Role and Purpose of the State Action Requirement in the
Structure of the Constitution
Any evaluation or application of the state action requirement must
28. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Because the defendants' actions did not violate section 1 of the Amendment, the Court
held, Congress did not have the power under section 5 to prohibit or otherwise regulate the
activity. Id. at 18-19. The Court stated:
[Tihe law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of legislative power made
to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. That amendment prohibits the States
from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws, and declares that Con-
gress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the
amendment. The law in question, without any reference to adverse State legislation
on the subject, declares that all persons shall be entitled to equal accommodations
and privileges of inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement, and im-
poses a penalty upon any individual who shall deny to any citizen such equal accom-
modations and privileges. This is not corrective legislation; it is primary and direct;
it takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right of admission to
inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement.... Whether it would not have
been a more effective protection of the rights of citizens to have clothed Congress
with plenary power over the whole subject, is not now the question. What we have to
decide is, whether such plenary power has been conferred upon Congress by the
Fourteenth Amendment; and, in our judgment, it has not.
Id.
Later cases have recognized broader congressional power under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment to enforce the Amendment than the Court allowed in Civil Rights Cases,
and they have construed the Thirteenth Amendment more broadly. But the essential holding
of the decision, that only the state can violate the Fourteenth Amendment and that state action
is a requirement in any action seeking the Amendment's protection, has remained intact.
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be based upon the values and purposes that the requirement serves.31
Understanding the purpose of the state action requirement in turn re-
quires an understanding of the role and purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, from which the state action requirement arises. "[Tihe
fundamental purpose of the fourteenth amendment [is] to protect the in-
dividual from arbitrary government interference." '32 The state action re-
quirement limits the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment to serving
that purpose only, and it prevents federal courts from using the Amend-
ment to govern directly the actions of individuals. In so doing, the state
action requirement preserves the federalist structure of governmental
power and maintains the separation of power among the branches of the
federal government.33
The federalist structure established by the Constitution contem-
plated a strong federal government but one that played a limited role in
regulating the daily activities of individuals and private entities. While
the Constitution limited congressional lawmaking power to specific enu-
merated areas, it left the states with "the general mass of power ... with
special exceptions only." 34 Although Congress intended the Fourteenth
Amendment to expand federal authority and contract state discretion, it
sought to do so by putting standards and limits on the actions of state
governments; it did not seek to expand federal substantive authority to
regulate individuals directly.35 By limiting the Amendment's application
to state governmental actors, therefore, the state action requirement pre-
vents federal courts from using the Amendment to regulate private activ-
31. See Burke & Reber, supra note 2, at 1009-10.
32. Id. at 1012.
33. See id. at 1011. According to a number of commentators, the state action requirement
also promotes or preserves individual liberty and the "private structuring of relationships."
Id. at 1016-17. Because the state action requirement does not preclude government from in-
truding upon private activities, however, it does not really protect individual liberty in an
absolute sense. The state action requirement, as distinguished from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself, does not prevent legislatures or state courts from intruding upon any private activ-
ity. See Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 383,
396-97 (1988). The state action requirement does prevent federal courts from intruding upon
and regulating private activities and relationships as a matter of constitutional law. See Burke
& Reber, supra note 2, at 1016-17.
34. Burke & Reber, supra note 2, at 1015 n.28 (quoting 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
199-200 (Hunt ed. 1910)).
35. See Choper, supra note 1, at 762. But see Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-
House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409, 418 &
n.40 (1990); Thompson, Piercing the Veil of State Action: The Revisionist Theory and a Mythi-
cal Application to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1, 15 (arguing that the drafters of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to protect the "fundamental rights" of United States
citizens from even private infringement).
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ity that the Constitution reserved for state-not federal-authority. 36
The state action requirement also prevents the federal courts from
using the Fourteenth Amendment to usurp authority that the Constitu-
tion granted to the executive and legislative branches. Federal judicial
authority to articulate positive law regulating private conduct is ex-
tremely limited.37 To the extent that the federal government has author-
ity to regulate private activities and relationships, that authority is vested
mainly in Congress. By limiting the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to governments, the state action requirement prevents fed-
eral courts from directly regulating private activity that the Constitution
deemed best governed by the representative branches.3"
II. State Action Theories
Having established the state action requirement in its post-Civil War
cases, the Court did not immediately articulate a test for determining
when the state action requirement is met. Determining when the state-
as distinguished from some private entity-has acted may have seemed
and may have been easy when the Court decided Civil Rights Cases.
Over the years, however, governments acted with or through not only
individual officers but also private citizens. In order to assure that this
type of "state action" was carried out within the constraints of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court devised a number of "state action theo-
ries" under which the Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutional
restraints applied to ostensibly private entities. This part of the Article
reviews and analyzes these theories.
Imposing categories and labels on the Court's different approaches
to state action issues is somewhat arbitrary and potentially misleading.
The Court seldom describes its decisions as creating a structure of dis-
crete state action theories.39 Rather, the Court's decisions follow the
more traditional judicial style of deciding each case based on the facts of
the case, guided by similarly fact-specific decisions of the past." In addi-
tion, the Court uses different phrases to refer to the same or similar theo-
36. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
37. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDIC-
TION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 120 (2d ed. 1990); J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 4.1-4.7 (1985).
38. See Burke & Reber, supra note 2, at 1017.
39. See, e.g., Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); Reit-
man v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961).
40. See, e.g., Pope, 485 U.S. 478; Reitman, 387 U.S. 369.
STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
ries.41 The Court's state action decisions also frequently contain
elements of several theories. 42
Nonetheless, the Court's state action decisions do create some
clearly distinguishable approaches to the state action issue. The govern-
ment function theory epitomized by Marsh v. Alabama,a3 for example,
clearly is a discrete conceptual approach from the joint participa-
tion/symbiosis theory epitomized in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority.' Analysis of the Court's state action decisions requires separate
analysis of the various theories under which the Court has applied the
Fourteenth Amendment to ostensibly private conduct. This section will
analyze the distinct state action theories by which each of the following
types of conduct may be considered state action and thus subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment: (A) overt actions of state employees, officers,
and agencies; 45 (B) the creation and enforcement of substantive civil law;
(C) state inaction: the denial of judicial relief or other state intervention;
(D) governmentally regulated private conduct; (E) joint participation be-
tween state officials and private entities; and (F) private entities assuming
government functions or powers.
A. Overt Conduct of State Employees, Officers, and Agencies
If the Fourteenth Amendment is to have any meaning, it must apply
to the overt activities of state officials and employees, especially when
they carry out official state policy. Such activities are the purest form of
state action. In one of its earliest decisions concerning the state action
issue, the Court declared:
41. For example, the Court in Burton did not expressly label the state action theory it
applied but characterized the state as a "joint participant" in the challenged private activity.
Burton, 365 U.S. at 715. Chief Justice Rehnquist later named this theory "symbiosis." Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972). For a discussion of this state action theory,
see infra notes 192-219 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974).
43. 326 U.S. 501, 506-08 (1946).
44. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
45. Although the state action "doctrine" generally refers to those decisions that determine
the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to private actors, this section will address the
full range of activities that can be considered state action, including activities that are undenia-
bly state action, such as the conduct of state employees and agents and state legislation. Mean-
ingful analysis of the state action doctrine requires that these topics be included because state
action in the end is a continuum from full state initiation and implementation to state authori-
zation of private activity to completely private initiation and implementation with no state
impact. Clear state action progressively fades into clear private action, and it is the role of the
state action doctrine to define where on this continuum the Fourteenth Amendment no longer
applies. Analysis of the state action doctrine requires analysis of any conduct near this ambig-
uous division.
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A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial au-
thorities. It can act in no other way. The [Fourteenth Amend-
ment], therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the
officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government,
deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due process of
law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, vio-
lates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and
for the State, and is clothed with the State's power ... his act is
that of the State.46
Furthermore, the Court consistently has held that the conduct of a
state officer or agency is state action subject to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment even if the officer's actions are contrary to official policy or state
law. In Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles,47 the Court rejected the
proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only those actions
of state officers that are authorized by the state.4" Rather, the Court
stated, the Amendment applies whenever "an officer or other representa-
tive of a State in the exercise of the authority with which he is clothed
misuses the power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the Amend-
ment[;] inquiry concerning whether the State has authorized the wrong is
irrelevant. ... 149 The Court repeatedly has adhered to this ruling to
hold state officers civilly and criminally liable under federal civil rights
statutes.50
Recent state action cases confirm the Court's continued adherence
to both of these rulings. The Court recently noted, for example, that the
actions of a state university unquestionably are subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 The Court stated: "A state university without question
is a state actor. When it decides to impose a serious disciplinary sanction
upon one of its tenured employees, it must comply with the terms of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 2 Likewise, the
Court stated in West v. Atkins53 that "a public employee [generally] acts
under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exer-
46. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880).
47. 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
48. Id. at 287.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945) (upheld the conviction of police officers under federal civil rights statute even though
the officers' actions-beating a man to death following his arrest-were a felony under state
law); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
51. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
52. Id. For additional discussion of this case, see infra notes 304-28 and accompanying
text.
53. 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
cising his responsibilities pursuant to state law." 4 The Court further
noted that Polk County v. Dodson 5 "is the only case in which [the] Court
has determined that a person who is employed by the State and who is
sued under section 1983 for abusing his position in the performance of
his assigned tasks was not acting under color of state law."56  The Dod-
son decision, the Court continued, turned on the peculiar "professional
obligation of the criminal defense attorney to be an adversary of the
State."5 7
State action is clearly present, therefore, when an officer or agent of
the state uses or abuses the power of his office. Few judges or scholars
have difficulty applying the Fourteenth Amendment in this type of case
because "the action is initiated and engaged in by a party who openly
proclaims his public position and the state authority under which he
acts."5" All of the Justices on the present Court apparently agree that
state action exists in these types of cases.59
B. The Creation and Enforcement of Substantive Civil Law
If any conduct can be attributed to the state, it is the creation of
state law by a state's official policy-making bodies. To the extent that a
state ever acts as a discrete entity, it is through its legislature or its com-
mon law courts. State law, the end product of the endeavors of these
policy-making bodies, is the quintessence of the state. Whether it is in
the form of legislation, common law, or any other official body of state
authority, state law is state action.60
State law6 includes the body of common and statutory law by
which courts decide private disputes. When citizens submit a dispute to
a court for resolution, the legal rule by which the court decides the dis-
pute is itself the product of state action.62 The substantive rule of law
54. Id. at 50.
55. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
56. West, 487 U.S. at 50.
57. Id. at 52.
58. Burke & Reber, supra note 2, at 1045.
59. See West, 487 U.S. at 49.
60. See, eg., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 392 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("There is no question that the adoption [of a state constitutional amendment] constituted
'state action' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Paul v. Watchtower Bible
& Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1987) ("State laws whether statutory or common
law ... constitute state action.").
61. "State law" here refers to all law promulgated by recognized governmental bodies,
including state, federal, and local governments.
62. All legal rules, not just those used to resolve civil disputes, are the product of state
action. Unlike legal rules that apply to civil disputes, however, legal rules applied in other
contexts almost universally are perceived to be state action. With respect to legal rules in such
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applied in every civil case dictates whether the state will afford relief, the
circumstances under which it will afford relief, and the nature of the re-
lief. By affording judicial relief, the state forcibly intervenes in the liti-
gants' dispute to require compensation or to regulate conduct. Even a
decision not to intervene-a decision not to afford relief but instead to
leave the parties to their own devices-is a decision by the state that
must conform to constitutional restraints on state action.6" Whether it is
in the form of a statute or a rule of common law, the substantive rule of
law applied in civil litigation is state action and thus must conform to the
constitutional restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment."
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan6" provides a familiar example of this
rule.66 Sullivan, an elected official in Alabama, filed that action in an
Alabama court alleging that an advertisement in the New York Times
libeled him. Some of the statements in the advertisement were in fact
false. Further, because the statements tended to injure Sullivan's reputa-
tion, the trial court deemed them "libelous per se."'67 Under Alabama
libel law, therefore, general damages and malice were presumed so that a
jury could and in fact did award compensatory damages without proof of
pecuniary injury or malice. 68 After the Alabama Supreme Court af-
firmed the judgment, New York Times Co. petitioned for certiorari, con-
tending that the Alabama law and the judgment violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.69
En route to holding Alabama defamation law unconstitutional, the
United States Supreme Court easily rejected Sullivan's argument that a
rule of law articulated and applied in a civil lawsuit is not state action
subject to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, it dis-
posed of the state action issue in a single paragraph, stating:
other contexts as the enforcement of criminal statutes or government regulations, for example,
governments not only formulate the rule but also initiate the rule's application and effect its
enforcement, all to serve governmental policy. Such governmental activity is pure state action.
See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text. Because private parties at their option invoke
the legal rules that govern civil litigation, courts have been more reluctant to apply the Four-
teenth Amendment to those laws.
63. See infra notes 101-08, 113-30 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 n.51 (1982)
("Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the application of state rules of law
by the Mississippi state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms
constitutes 'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Paul, 819 F.2d at 880.
65. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
66. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1491 (1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; Tushnet, supra note 33, at 385 (1988).
67. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 262-63, 267.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 264.
STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Ala-
bama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners
claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional free-
doms of speech and press. It matters not that law has been applied
in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supple-
mented by statute. . . . The test is not the form in which state
power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such
power has in fact been exercised.7°
The fact that state law constitutes state action does not mean, of
course, that the law is unconstitutional. A court faced with a constitu-
tional attack on that substantive law still must decide the distinct issue of
whether the law violates constitutional restrictions. The law's applica-
tion may result in the state's forcibly taking a defendant's property by
enforcing a judgment for damages or restricting his liberty with an in-
junction, but such action without more does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court must determine if the law applied takes the de-
fendant's property or restricts his liberty "without due process of law" or
denies him "equal protection of the laws."' 7 1 Deciding whether the sub-
stantive state law in question violates these restrictions is an issue of sub-
stantive constitutional law that is distinct from the state action question.
In determining the constitutionality of substantive law applied in
civil litigation, courts must distinguish the action of the state from the
conduct of the litigants seeking relief. Judicial enforcement of a plain-
tiff's legal rights does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment just be-
cause the plaintiff's motives or conduct would violate the Amendment if
they were the state's.72 The real state action is the creation and applica-
tion of a substantive rule of law. Ordinarily, then, it is that state action-
the creation and application of law-to which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies.7" The state law and its application violate the Fourteenth
Amendment only if the law's application itself-as distinct from the con-
70. Id. at 265 (citations omitted).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72. The classic example of this point is the case of a private homeowner who welcomes his
white neighbors onto his property but who institutes criminal trespass actions against any of
his black neighbors who enter his property. See McCoy, Current State Action Theories, the
Jackson Nexus Requirement, and Employee Discharges by Semi-Public and State-Aided Institu-
tions, 31 VAND. L. REV. 785, 792 & n.29 (1978). Although the state would violate the Four-
teenth Amendment if it acted as the homeowner did, few would argue that the state's criminal
prosecution and conviction of the trespasser at the insistence of the homeowner violates the
Amendment. See, e.g., id.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 66, at 1494.
73. The conduct of ostensibly private litigants may be deemed state action under the other
state action theories discussed below. Their conduct is not state action, however, simply be-
cause they seek judicial enforcement of their perceived legal rights.
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duct of the plaintiff-deprives the aggrieved citizen of property or liberty
without due process of law or denies equal protection of the laws.
In Sullivan, for example, the Court ruled that Alabama defamation
law as applied by the Alabama courts violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, quite apart from the plaintiff's private actions.74 The Court rea-
soned that Alabama's imposition of liability for a merely negligent-as
opposed to a purposeful or reckless-publication of a false statement,
would deter "would-be critics of official conduct.., from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in
fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of
the expense of having to do so."
75
Only in the controversial and ambiguous case of Shelley v. Krae-
mer 76 has the Court suggested that a plaintiff's conduct is state action
merely because the state affords her judicial relief. The Court, however,
has refused, for the most part,77 to recognize that theory of state action in
subsequent cases.78
In Shelley, the owners of a number of adjacent tracts of land signed
and recorded a covenant restricting occupancy of the land to whites.7 9
The owners of one tract sold and conveyed their land to the Shelleys, a
black family. Owners of other property subject to the covenant then filed
a civil action in a Missouri court to enforce the covenant. After the Mis-
souri Supreme Court held that the covenant should be enforced pursuant
to racially neutral rules of contract and property law, the Shelleys peti-
74. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264-65. One could argue that the mere existence of a law with-
out any enforcement or specific application to individuals or disputes, though state action, does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because without enforcement it arguably deprives no
one of life, liberty, property, or equal protection of the laws. One likewise can argue that a
court's denial of relief, though state action, does not deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property.
By denying relief, the state merely chooses not to intervene in the dispute and leaves the pri-
vate parties to their own devices. See infra notes 101-30 and accompanying text. When the
court grants judicial relief, however, the state itself plainly deprives the defendant of interests
protected by the Due Process Clause. A judgment for damages uses state power to take prop-
erty from the defendant, and an injunction uses state power to restrict the defendant's liberty.
75. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. The Court thus held that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments "[prohibit] a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
Id. at 279-80.
76. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
77. The Court really followed Shelley only in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), in
which the Court extended Shelley's holding to apply not only to equitable enforcement of
restrictive covenants, but also to judicial awards of damages for breach of the covenants.
78. See, G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1002-06 (10th ed. 1980); McCoy, supra
note 71, at 792; Schneider, State Action-Making Sense Out of Chaos-An Historical Ap-
proach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737, 754 (1985).
79. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 45.
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tioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, contending that
Missouri's enforcement of the covenant violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, in "one of the most
controversial and problematical decisions in all of constitutional law,"8 0
held that the state court's enforcement of the covenant was state action
that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'
The Court's ruling is troubling not because it treats judicial action as
state action, but because the Missouri court's action appears, on the sur-
face at least, to be entirely consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
The Missouri court simply applied Missouri's racially neutral contract
and property law to a private dispute over a private agreement. Neither
the court nor Missouri's lawmakers initiated any discrimination or ap-
parently intended to discriminate against blacks in either the creation or
application of Missouri law. Missouri law provided for the enforcement
of many types of contractual restrictions on the use and disposition of
land as long as the restrictions met various racially neutral and constitu-
tionally innocuous requirements.8 2 Missouri law provided enforcement
not only of covenants prohibiting occupancy by blacks but also cove-
nants prohibiting occupancy by whites and covenants unrelated to race. 3
Any racial discrimination, then, was in the private contract among the
landowners, not Missouri law or its application. Neither Missouri law
nor the Missouri court treated citizens differently on the basis of race.
The Missouri court's application of Missouri law to enforce the covenant
thus appeared to have been entirely race-neutral.
The United States Supreme Court nonetheless held the Missouri
court's enforcement of the covenant unconstitutional without articulat-
ing any basis for the ruling. Most of the opinion addresses the contention
that judicial enforcement of the common law is state action, a point that
is difficult to contradict.8 4 With little discussion of the discrete substan-
tive issue of whether the law and its application are constitutional, the
opinion concludes that the enforcement of the common law in this case
violates equal protection. 5 The Shelley Court made no effort to distin-
80. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 66, at 1491.
81. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 8-23.
82. See, eg., Williams v. Carr, 213 Mo. App. 223, 225-26, 248 S.W. 625, 626-27 (1923);
Kenwood Land Co. v. Hancock Inv. Co., 169 Mo. App. 715, 722-23, 155 S.W. 861, 863-64
(1913).
83. See Murphy v. Timber Trace Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 603, 607-08 (1989); infra note 87.
84. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text; see also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 66, at 1491-92.
85. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 66, at 1492.
Spring 1991]
604 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 18:587
guish the state's action of enforcing its common law and the plaintiff's
action of entering a racially discriminatory restrictive covenant. Nor did
the Court articulate how the state was constitutionally responsible for the
plaintiff's racial discrimination.8 6
Three possible grounds exist to support the Court's conclusion that
the Missouri court's enforcement of the covenant violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. The Supreme Court must have held: (1) that Missouri
law or its application really was not racially neutral in some way that the
Court did not articulate;87 (2) that "judicial enforcement of private ac-
tion transformed [the private conduct] into state action"; 8 or (3) that the
Equal Protection Clause does not permit the state to be racially neutral
in the circumstances of the case but rather requires the state to prevent
private discrimination.89
If the Court based its ruling on the first possibility-an unarticu-
lated perception that Missouri law and its application were not really
race-neutral-then the case is unexceptional. The Court in that case was
simply applying conventional equal protection law, which forbids state
law to treat blacks and whites differently without a compelling reason.90
86. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
29-30 (1959).
87. Professor Tribe, for example, suggests that Missouri property law was not neutral:
Like other states, Missouri treats most restraints on the alienability of real estate as
judicially unenforceable: to enforce any such restraint, a state court must first find
that the substance of the restraining covenant is reasonable and consistent with pub-
lic policy. Therefore, the issue is not whether any judicial enforcement of racially
invidious private arrangements constitutes racially invidious state action, but
whether a state may choose automatically to enforce restrictive covenants that dis-
criminate against blacks while generally regarding alienability restraints as anathema.
The real "state action" in Shelley was Missouri's facially discriminatory body of
common and statutory law .... The state court's refusal to invalidate the racist
covenant before it was simply the overt state act necessary to bring the state's legal
order to the bar of the United States Supreme Court.
L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 260 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Although this view
of Shelley is analytically sound, evidence in the Court's opinion that the Court embraced this
view as the basis of its ruling is sparse.
The Shelley Court did note that the plaintiff's contention that Missouri law stands ready
to enforce covenants excluding whites did "not bear scrutiny." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 21-22 (1948). The Court stated, "The parties have directed our attention to no case in
which a court, state or federal, has been called upon to enforce a covenant excluding members
of the white majority from ownership or occupancy of real property on grounds of race or
color." Id. at 22. Although the Court went on to discount the relevancy of the plaintiff's
argument on other grounds, id., this statement suggests that the Court did suspect that the
law, though neutral, perhaps was discriminatorily enforced.
88. Schneider, supra note 78, at 754; see also G. GUNTHER, supra note 78, at 1000-03;
Choper, supra note 1, at 761; McCoy, supra note 72, at 792-93.
89. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1714-15.
90. The Court did note that no case had been found in which the courts enforced a cove-
nant to exclude the white majority from occupying land. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22.
If this was the basis for the Court's ruling, however, the Court's opinion
certainly did not explain how Missouri treated blacks and whites differ-
ently. Furthermore, the Court found it irrelevant that the Missouri
courts stood ready to "deny white persons rights of ownership and occu-
pancy on grounds of race or color" as well as blacks.91 If there is a
generally applicable principle of constitutional law underlying the ruling,
then,92 it must be one of the latter two.
Yet if the Court based its ruling on either of the two remaining
grounds, Shelley made a radical change not only in the state action doc-
trine but also in the substantive requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause. Under these theories, whenever litigants assert a common law or
statutory right to effectuate their own racially discriminatory purposes,
judicial enforcement of the legal right would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, regardless of the bona fides and race-neutrality of the law,
its purpose, and its application.93 Indeed, "any case involving judicial
enforcement of a private legal right to do something that the state could
not do without violating the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment" would be un-
constitutional state action under these theories.94 Whenever one party to
a private transaction "balks at consensual compliance [forcing] the other
party to bring legal proceedings to enforce his alleged rights," the plain-
tiff's actions would be subject to constitutional scrutiny if judicial relief is
awarded.95 These theories, then, would effectively subject large portions
of private life and private choice to direct constitutional (and, hence, fed-
eral judicial) control.96 As Professor Choper has demonstrated persua-
sively, such wholesale regulation of private individuals' actions and
motivations is contrary to the central thrust and purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment and indeed the Constitution.97
91. Id.
92. Some critics of the case contend that the ruling was result-oriented and devoid of
"neutral principles" or general application. See Wechsler, supra note 86, at 29-31; see also
McCoy, supra note 72, at 793.
93. See McCoy, supra note 72, at 792.
94. Id. at 792.
95. Choper, supra note 1, at 761.
96. G. GUNTHER, supra note 78, at 1002 ("Given the entanglements of private choices
with law, a broad application of Shelley would in effect have left no private choices immune
from constitutional restraints."); Schneider, supra note 78, at 753.
97. "Although [the Fourteenth Amendment's] major purpose was to augment the author-
ity of the national government to secure certain constitutional rights, its primary thrust was to
accomplish this goal by outlawing deprivations of these rights by state governments and their
legal structures rather than by the impact of private choice." Choper, supra note 1, at 762; see
supra notes 11-22, 32 and accompanying text.
Although such broad theories of state action are contrary to the basic thrust of the
Amendment, Professor Choper notes, they are not necessarily "logically or analytically"
flawed, and they are not in conflict with the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Choper,
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Perhaps for this reason, the Court has not given Shelley an expan-
sive reading,9" despite a substantial body of literature supporting such a
broad theory of state action.99 Indeed, the Court seldom cites the case
even when it is relevant, largely leaving it as an isolated anomaly."co
Under current doctrine, therefore, substantive civil law and its judicial
enforcement are state action subject to the Fourteenth Amendment like
any other law. The law and its enforcement, however, violate the Four-
teenth Amendment only if the law or enforcement itself violates the
Amendment.
C. State Inaction: The Denial of Judicial Relief or Other State
Intervention as State Action
Just as the creation and judicial application of law to grant judicial
relief in civil litigation is state action, the state's decision to deny judicial
or other intervention in private affairs is state action.101 Legislatures
deny relief for particular types of private claims, for example, by defining
supra note 1, at 761. Indeed, a broad application of Shelley does not require a reading of the
Equal Protection Clause that imposes true affirmative obligations on states to prevent racial
discrimination. It does not require, for example, that the state affirmatively act to prevent
private racial discrimination or perhaps even to provide judicial relief for any private wrong.
Thus, a state could constitutionally refuse to intervene whenever a landowner seeks to eject
trespassers. The state in such an instance simply would leave the parties in a state of nature to
resolve their dispute as best they can using their own devices within the bounds of other appli-
cable law. Once the state establishes judicial and law enforcement machinery and decides to
create a remedy for trespass whereby it forcibly intervenes to resolve the dispute, however, the
state has acted affirmatively. The state is obligated to undertake such action-the creation of
judicial and law enforcement machinery and the creation of judicial remedies-without deny-
ing anyone equal protection of the laws. One can argue that the Equal Protection Clause
requires the state to design its judicial and law enforcement machinery in such a way that it is
not used as a tool of private discrimination. This could be accomplished simply by refusing the
customary judicial relief whenever the plaintiff's claim is motivated by racial discrimination.
Although such an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause may be logically defensi-
ble in some ways, it runs contrary to the purpose and scope of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Constitution because it amounts to constitutional regulation of private individual choice.
Id. at 761-65; see infra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
98. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 78, at 1002-03.
99. E.g., R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 171-72; Chemerinsky,
supra note 1, at 524-26; Haber, Notes on the Limits of Shelley v. Kraemer, 18 RUTGERS L.
REV. 811 (1964); Henkin, supra note 15, at 473, 490-91; Horowitz, The Misleading Search for
"State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 208, 209 (1957).
100. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 78, at 1002-03; Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 526; Mc-
Coy, supra note 72, at 792-93; Schneider, supra note 78, at 754. But see McCoy, supra note 72,
at 793 n.34 (discussing the Court's reliance on Shelley in a minor part of its decision in Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972)).
101. Governments can forcefully intervene in private affairs in innumerable ways to protect
individuals from harm inflicted by private entities. They do so by making certain conduct
criminal and punishing those who engage in the conduct. They regulate private entities to
assure that they do not subject others to unreasonable risks of harm. They afford civil judicial
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or redefining the elements of a cause of action, by imposing statutes of
limitation, or by completely eliminating otherwise viable rights of action.
Legislatures also refuse to intervene in private affairs to protect individu-
als from privately inflicted harm by refusing to make certain conduct
criminal or refusing to regulate it. Common law courts likewise deny
relief to entire classes of civil claims by defining the elements of the cause
of action in a certain way, by imposing heightened burdens of proof, and
by refusing to recognize certain causes of action. Regardless of which
governmental branch makes the decision, the decision to deny relief,
which is made by the state's official policy-making bodies, unquestiona-
bly is state action.102
Regardless of its form, this decision is simply a decision not to inter-
vene in particular types of private disputes.103 Some states, for example,
recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
without requiring contemporaneous physical impact while others do
not."° Whether acting by statute or by common law, the states that
recognize the tort decided to intervene when a private plaintiff proves
that a private defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff to suffer emo-
tional distress.105 These states force the defendants to compensate the
victims of their "wrongdoing." Other states have decided that they will
not intervene to transfer the cost of such conduct to the defendants, leav-
ing the harm of such conduct where it falls.106 Legislatures and appellate
courts have made this decision for a variety of reasons.10 7 Trial courts
then implement the decision by dismissing complaints for failure to state
relief such as injunctions to halt harmful private conduct or award damages to force private
entities to compensate the victims of their harmful conduct.
102. See, eg., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 392-93 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(Although Justice Harlan dissented from the Court's conclusion that California's constitu-
tional amendment violated equal protection, he acknowledged that "[t]here is no question that
the adoption of [the amendment by which the state asserted neutrality on racial discrimination
in housing and denied judicial relief from such discrimination] constituted 'state action' within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Goodman, Professor Brest on State
Action and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1331, 1337
(1982).
103. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1978).
104. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 54 (Cumm. Supp. 1988); 1 J.
DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW: LITIGATION AND LIABILITY § 15.06 (1982).
105. See Penick v. Mirro, 189 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Va. 1960); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); W. KEETON, supra note 104.
106. W. KEETON, supra note 104, § 54.
107. Various states have refused to afford relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress
in the absence of physical impact for one or more of the following reasons: (1) proof of harm
and causation are difficult to establish; (2) emotional distress cannot be measured accurately;
and (3) affording relief for such conduct would cause an immense increase in litigation. Id.
§§ 12, 54.
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a claim, entering summary judgments against the plaintiff, or directing a
verdict against the plaintiff. The denial of judicial relief in any given
private dispute, therefore, is simply the state's decision not to intervene;
and it is state action.10 8
If uniformly applied to all litigants, a state's decision to deny relief
and to leave private disputants to their own devices does not, as a general
rule, raise any constitutional problems. The state generally has no con-
stitutional obligation to intervene in private disputes either to protect in-
dividuals from harm inflicted by other private entities or to force the
wrongful private entities to compensate the victims of their "wrongdo-
ing."' 9 Certainly most people expect the state to provide such protec-
tion from or compensation for at least the more flagrant private wrongs,
and voters quickly would elect officials that would pass statutes provid-
ing such protection and judicially enforced compensation if the state did
not already provide it. But the Constitution does not require the state to
provide such protection or compensation.110 The state may constitution-
ally leave its citizens in a state of nature to fend for themselves with
respect to most if not all instances of allegedly wrongful private con-
duct."' In other words, the Constitution permits the state to remain
108. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 392 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
109. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) ("noth-
ing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life,
liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors"); Bowers v. Devito, 686
F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); Goodman, supra note 102, at 1340 ("most [judges] are apt to
fecognize that affirmative duties of protection, if any there be, are the exception rather than the
rule"). But see Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 523; Gerhardt, supra note 35 (arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment creates positive rights that require governmental intervention).
110. See P. KAUPER, supra note 17, at 129-30.
111. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-96. Judge Posner has written:
There is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered
by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents
against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution. The
Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it
does not require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so
elementary a service as maintaining law and order.
Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618.
Certainly one can debate the merits of intervening or not intervening, but that debate
should be addressed to the state's policy-making bodies, its legislature, or its common law
courts. The fact that nearly everyone supports the state's intervention to judicially enforce
compensation for certain well-established civil causes of action does not make such interven-
tion a constitutional obligation of the state. Such state intervention is well-entrenched not
because of the Constitution, but because there is consensus that states should provide such
assistance, and the states' policy-making bodies in turn have translated that consensus into
well-established statutory or common law rights of action. Cf. P. KAUPER, supra note 17, at
129-30 (the "rights" that an individual has vis-A-vis other individuals are the product of com-
mon law and legislation-not of the Constitution).
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neutral in private disputes, to deny judicial relief or other intervention to
plaintiffs in those disputes, and to leave the harms of private conduct
where they fall.
The state's decision to deny relief in any given private dispute, there-
fore, is unlikely to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. When the state
decides not to intervene, it takes no property and it does not restrict lib-
erty. Rather, it leaves the private disputants as it finds them. One of the
disputants may have taken the other's property or restricted the other's
liberty, but the state's refusal to intervene in the dispute on the basis of
such conduct is not itself a deprivation or restriction.112 Standing by
while another commits a wrong, while perhaps morally objectionable and
poor government policy, is not the same as committing the wrong one-
self. Because the state itself does not deprive anyone of life, liberty, or
property when it refuses to intervene in a given private dispute, the state
cannot be said to deprive anyone of such interests without due process of
law.
Likewise, a state's decision to decline intervening in a certain type of
private dispute cannot violate equal protection if the state applies the
decision uniformly to all litigants and the decision is not motivated by
intent to discriminate. Certainly a state could not intervene to afford
judicial relief to white citizens who were victims of battery but not afford
such relief to black citizens. 113 But a state's consistent decision not to
recognize and afford judicial relief for the tort of battery for any litigant
would not violate equal protection. 114 The state's consistent decision not
112. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-96; Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978);
Reitman, 387 U.S. at 392-95 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618 (Posner, J.).
Flagg Bros. is discussed further infra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
113. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.3 ("The State may not ... selectively deny its protective
services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause. See
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).").
114. Such a decision with respect to the tort of battery, of course, is so unlikely as to be
purely hypothetical because of the near universal consensus supporting state intervention to
prevent battery or to force those who commit battery to compensate their victims for the harm
inflicted. Indeed, while the issue has never been squarely raised before the courts, some com-
mentators and even some courts have suggested that certain civil causes of action (such as
battery perhaps) are so ancient and so much a part of our ideas about what governments
should do, that failure to provide these causes of action and the accompanying judicial inter-
vention in private disputes may violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S.
at 170 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Goodman, supra note 120, at 1337 n.20 ("If all laws authoriz-
ing one person summarily to seize another's property were constitutional, the protectiveness of
the due process clause ... would be severely compromised.").
A state's decision not to intervene in other types of disputes such as claims of negligent
infliction of emotional distress, however, is quite likely and realistic. See supra notes 103-08
and accompanying text. Few would argue that such a decision violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, several states have made that decision. See supra notes 106-07.
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to intervene in particular types of private disputes, while state action, is
almost always constitutional.
A number of influential commentators, however, disagree, arguing
that the Fourteenth Amendment significantly restricts the state's discre-
tion to refuse state intervention and to deny judicial relief.1 '5 The plain-
tiff in a civil lawsuit, they note, claims some right that has been restricted
or destroyed by the defendant's challenged practice. Unable to stop the
defendant's challenged practice on his own, the plaintiff seeks state assist-
ance in preserving his "right" or interest by filing a civil action against
the defendant. The litigants' interests thus are in conflict, and the state
must decide whether to afford relief to the plaintiff or to leave the defend-
ant victorious.1 16 By refusing to intervene to afford the plaintiff relief
from the defendant's challenged practice, the argument goes, the state
gives a preference to the challenged conduct of the defendant over the
alleged "right" of the plaintiff to be free from the challenged conduct.
When a litigant challenges a private act under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, therefore, "the complainant is claiming that the state has deprived
him of some right by granting a legal preference to the challenged prac-
tice."' 17 State action accordingly is always present in the state's decision,
these commentators argue, and the Court must determine whether the
state's decision violates the Fourteenth Amendment. These commenta-
tors also argue that to determine the constitutionality of the state's action
of refusing to intervene on behalf of the plaintiff,
the [United States Supreme] Court must determine whether the
Constitution dictates a preference for one right above the other.
To resolve this conflict it would seem that the Court must balance
the relative merits of permitting the challenged practice to con-
tinue against the limitation which it imposes on the asserted
right." 8
115. For various formulations of this and similar theories, see R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK &
3. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 194-98; Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296 (1982); Chemerinsky, supra note 1; Glen-
non Jr. & Nowak, A FunctionalAnalysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Require-
ment, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221; Haber, supra note 99; Henkin, supra note 15; Horowitz, supra
note 99, at 209; Quinn, State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed Cure, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 146
(1976); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1961).
116. The defendant ordinarily is victorious if the state stays out of the dispute, because the
defendant is satisfied with the status quo and the plaintiff is trying to change it. The plaintiff's
recognition that the defendant will prevail in the absence of state intervention is what prompts
the plaintiff to initiate litigation to invoke the assistance of state power.
117. R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 196.
118. Id. For various formulations of this and similar approaches to state action, see the
articles cited supra note 109. For a concise survey of these arguments, see Choper, supra note
1, at 760-61; Thompson, supra note 34, at 9-13, 22-23. Professor Choper summarizes one of
the earlier articles proposing this type of approach as follows:
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If a private social club excludes blacks, for example, these commentators
contend that the Court should determine the constitutionality of the
club's conduct by deciding whether the excluded blacks' interest in being
free from racial discrimination is more important than the club members'
interest in choosing the people with whom they associate." 9
The difficulty with these approaches to "state action" is that they
conflict with the central function of the Fourteenth Amendment and in-
deed most of the Constitution.12 As discussed above, the central func-
tion of the Constitution is to regulate and limit the activities of
governments, leaving "the regulation of the myriad relationships that oc-
cur between one individual and another"12' to federal and state legisla-
tion and state common law.' 22  "Although [the Fourteenth
Amendment's] major purpose was to augment the authority of the na-
tional government to secure certain constitutional rights," Professor
Choper writes, "its primary thrust was to accomplish this goal by out-
lawing deprivations of these rights by state governments and their legal
structures rather than by the impact of private choice."' 23
Yet the all-encompassing theories of state action advocated by com-
mentators result in direct constitutional regulation of private conduct
[I]n their influential article advocating this approach, Karst and Van Alstyne urged
that in adjudicating these problems the courts should (1) identify the "multiplicity of
interests which compete for respect in each case," (2) assess the impact that alterna-
tive judicial decisions would have on these interests, (3) determine the effect of fed-
eral intervention "on the policy of encouraging local responsibility," and then (4)
ultimately balance and select the "values for constitutional preference."
Choper, supra note 1, at 763 (quoting Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 114, at 7-8, 58).
119. See Glennon Jr. & Nowak, supra note 115, at 241-43 (discussing Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)). Indeed, Professors Glennon and Nowak argue that the
Court actually uses this approach in deciding state action cases but then obscures its decisions
by applying "formalistic state action tests" in its opinions. Id. at 260.
120. Choper, supra note 1, at 761-65. After reviewing various formulations of this ap-
proach to state action, Professor Choper states:
The difficulty with both the state permission-toleration and judicial enforcement
theories of state action is not that they fail, either logically or analytically, "to satisfy
the demand for 'neutral,' general principles of adjudication" or "to promise consis-
tent application to foreseeable situations." Nor are they at war with the language of
the fourteenth amendment, which requires only that the state neither "deprive" any
person of due process nor "deny" equal protection-consequences that literally may
occur through state inaction as well as through state action.
Id. at 761-62 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 762.
122. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
123. Choper, supra note 1, at 762; see Graglia, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?-
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 83, 88 (1989). But see supra note 34.
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and private relationships.124 According to these theories, the Constitu-
tion dictates which litigants' interests are superior in at least some private
litigation and mandates the state to rule in favor of the litigant whose
interests are "constitutionally favored." 125 If the plaintiff's interests are
constitutionally superior, then the Constitution requires the state to in-
tervene and to award relief.126 Moreover, it is the litigants' private con-
duct, rather than any state action or inaction,127 that makes state
intervention a constitutional requirement under these theories. The rela-
tive constitutional merits of the disputants' private conduct dictate that
the state grant relief; denying relief would favor the defendant's "consti-
tutionally inferior" interests. 128 Such a constitutional requirement, based
as it is on the relative merits of the disputants' private conduct, is a con-
stitutional prohibition on the defendant's private conduct. There is no
difference in saying that the Constitution prohibits individuals from do-
ing "x" and saying that the Constitution requires the state to enjoin indi-
viduals from doing "x" when asked to do so in civil litigation.129 This
constitutional regulation of private conduct is completely at odds with
the central themes of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 130
124. Indeed, one commentator expressly stated that "the fundamental question presented
by every state action case is, broadly expressed, whether and under what circumstances we as
private citizens must conform to the standards we set for our government .... Put another
way, under what conditions should an otherwise private individual or entity be held accounta-
ble to the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments?" Thompson, supra note
35, at 22.
125. See Glennon Jr. & Nowak, supra note 115, at 230-31.
126. Id.
127. The Constitution requires such intervention under these theories even though a deci-
sion by the state not to intervene would not itself deny anyone life, liberty, property, or equal
protection of the laws.
128. Glennon Jr. & Nowak, supra note 115, at 230-32.
129. Likewise, saying that the Constitution forbids the state to favor the defendant's
"right" or interest is the same as saying that the Constitution requires the state to grant state-
enforced judicial relief.
130. Goodman, supra note 102, at 1336. Professor Goodman writes:
The recognition of affirmative governmental duties to regulate private conduct,
though consistent perhaps with the letter of the state action requirement, is in dero-
gation of its basic philosophy: that the conflicting interests of nongovernmental ac-
tors should, in general at least, be resolved through the democratic political process
(or through legislatively reversible common-law adjudication) rather than through
judicial application of the fourteenth amendment.
Id.
This recognition of affirmative governmental duties would be contrary to the governmen-
tal structure created by and embodied in the Constitution even if the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment were precise. As the history of fourteenth amendment litigation demonstrates,
however, the dictates of the Due Process Clause are open-ended and subject to wide-ranging
interpretations even when applied to governments. The requirements of due process inevitably
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Although the Supreme Court did not focus directly on the state's
decision not to intervene, the Court apparently confirmed the constitu-
tionality of such state inaction"' in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks. 32 Brooks, the
plaintiff in Flagg Bros., was evicted from her apartment and a city mar-
shal arranged for her possessions to be stored by the defendant Flagg
Brothers in its warehouse. 33 A dispute subsequently arose between
Brooks and Flagg Brothers regarding Brooks's failure to pay the charges
that Flagg Brothers claimed were due for the storage. After a series of
letters failed to resolve the dispute, Flagg Brothers notified Brooks that it
intended to sell Brooks's possessions pursuant to the New York Uniform
Commercial Code 3 4 to cover the charges. That statute provides that a
warehouseman may enforce a warehouseman's lien by selling the goods
subject to the lien in any commercially reasonable sale after notifying all
would be even more ambiguous if applied to the relative merits of competing private interests.
One wonders, for example, whether the law governing the tort of invasion of privacy would
become entirely a matter of constitutional definition under this theory, given the Court's recog-
nition of a constitutional right of privacy. Professor Choper warns:
[T]hese theories eviscerate the Fourteenth Amendment's restriction on the authority
of the national government vis-i-vis the states regarding the regulation of the myriad
relationships that occur between one individual and another. These approaches re-
quire that all private activity, except that small amount which is beyond all govern-
mental control, conform to federal constitutional standards.
Thus, at the initiative of any litigant who is offended by another person's behav-
ior, these theories would subject to the scrntiny of federal judges, under substantive
constitutional standards customarily developed for measuring the actions of govern-
ment, all sorts of private conduct.... Further,... these theories would delegate to
federal judges the power to implement the vague mandate of the Due Process Clause
in speaking the final word about the validity of virtually all transactions between
individuals.
Choper, supra note 1, at 762. The role of Congress, state legislatures, and state courts in
weighing the relative merits of competing private interests would be usurped by the federal
courts balancing those same interests as a matter of constitutional interpretation subject only
to the check of the constitutional amendment process.
131. "Inaction" is an imprecise term to apply to the state's conduct in such instances. The
state is not literally inactive in such instances but rather makes an affirmative decision to re-
main neutral and to deny judicial intervention in the dispute before it. The state cannot re-
main passively neutral because a plaintiff eventually will seek relief in the state's courts, and
the state then must decide whether to intervene. If no plaintiff ever sought the state's interven-
tion, the constitutionality of the state's decision not to intervene would never arise.
132. 436 U.S. 149 (1978); see R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 197
n.8.
133. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 153. Brooks included the city marshal as a defendant in her
complaint alleging that the marshal led her to believe that she had no choice but to let Flagg
Brothers store her possessions. Brest, supra note 115, at 1304-05 (quotes pertinent portions of
Brooks' complaint). The parties, however, dismissed the marshal from the case by consent.
436 U.S. at 157. Moreover, Brooks apparently did not assert the association between Flagg
Brothers and the city marshal as grounds for applying the Fourteenth Amendment to Flagg
Brothers' actions. Brest, supra note 115, at 1305 n.32.
134. N.Y. U.C.C. § 7-210 (McKinney 1964) (current version at N.Y. U.C.C. § 7-210
(1990)) (quoted in Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 151-52 n.1).
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persons having a claim or interest in the goods. Brooks then filed a sec-
tion 1983135 action against Flagg Brothers seeking damages and an in-
junction against the threatened sale. 136 Brooks contended that the sale of
her goods without a hearing was state action and violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. She argued, among other
things,'37 that the sale of her property was state action because "the State
has authorized and encouraged it [the sale] in enacting § 7-210. '1138
The Court held that Flagg Brothers' sale of Brooks' belongings was
not state action subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the impact of state
law on private action sometimes makes the state responsible for the pri-
vate action and subjects the action to the restraints of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, the "State is responsible for the.., act of a
private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act." 139 Chief
Justice Rehnquist added, however, that the "Court has never held that a
State's mere acquiescence in a private action" converts the private act
into state action." ° Earlier cases "clearly rejected ... the imposition of
Fourteenth Amendment restraints on private action by the simple device
of characterizing the State's inaction as 'authorization' or 'encourage-
ment.' "14 Acting through its legislature, New York merely decided not
to intervene in this type of dispute; the state decided not to interfere with
a warehouseman's private decision142 to sell goods to recover storage
costs.143 The state's decision not to act at all did not "authorize" or
"encourage" Flagg Brothers' threatened sale; it merely permitted the sale
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This statute creates civil liability for injuries caused by dep-
rivation of rights secured by the Constitution.
136. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 153.
137. Brooks argued that Flagg Brothers' actions were subject to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment both because New York by enacting § 7-210 had delegated to Flagg Brothers the govern-
mental function of enforcing binding dispute resolution and because the statute authorized and
encouraged the sale. Chief Justice Rehnquist's treatment of Brooks' government function ar-
gument is discussed infra notes 249-61 and accompanying text.
138. Flagg Bros, 436 U.S. at 164.
139. Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)). Chief Justice
Rehnquist also cites Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), in which the Court
held that state law could not constitutionally compel a private club to comply with its own
discriminatory by-laws. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 177.
140. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164.
141. Id. at 164-65 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 190).
142. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Flagg Brothers did nothing more than what it
would tend to do in the absence of state law on the subject: "dispose of respondents' property
in order to free up its valuable storage space" and to recover some portion of the unpaid
accrued costs of storing the property. Flagg Bros, 436 U.S. at 162 n.12.
143. Id. at 166.
and refused to prohibit it.1" The Court held that the statute's existence
did not transform Flagg Brothers' actions into state action. 145
Although the opinion focused on the issue of whether Flagg Broth-
ers was a state actor,1 46 it suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist views the
enactment of section 7-210 as state action and that he perceives the stat-
ute as being entirely consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.147 He
notes that a legislative decision not to intervene and to deny judicial relief
in particular types of disputes is no different from a judicial decision to
the same effect. 14  He also apparently acknowledges that such decisions
are state action subject to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment:
If New York had no commercial statutes at all, its courts would
still be faced with the decision whether to prohibit or to permit the
sort of sale threatened here the first time an aggrieved bailor came
before them for relief. A judicial decision to deny relief would be
no less an "authorization" or "encouragement" of that sale than
the legislature's decision embodied in this statute. It was recog-
nized in the earliest interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment
"that a State may act through different agencies,--either by its leg-
islative, its executive, or its judicial authorities; and the prohibi-
144. See Goodman, supra note 102, at 1337-39. The notion that "'What the state autho-
rizes, the state does' may reflect a confusion between two senses in which a state can be said to
'authorize' private action: delegation and permission." Id. at 1338.
145. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164-66.
146. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 1712 ("Justice Rehnquist began his state action inquiry for
the Flagg Brothers majority by focusing not on the governmental rules implicated by the par-
ticular right asserted by Ms. Brooks, but on whether public or private actors were responsible
for her injury."); cf R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 197 n.8.
For a succinct but insightful discussion of the "difference between the proposition ...
that a statutory or decisional rule permitting private conduct is state action and the [related]
proposition ... that the conduct so permitted is state action," see Goodman, supra note 102, at
1340. (Professor Goodman agrees with the former proposition and not the latter.)
147. See Goodman, supra note 102, at 1337. Professor Goodman "doubt[s] that Justice
Rehnquist meant to deny" that the statute was state action. Id. He writes:
Except for a single footnote sentence, Justice Rehnquist's discussion of the state
action issue focuses exclusively on the behavior of the self-helping creditor, not on
the statute. In that sentence he states that "[ilt would intolerably broaden ... the
notion of state action ... to hold that the mere existence of a body of property law
... whether decisional or statutory, itself amounted to 'state action' even though no
state process or state officials were ever involved in enforcing that body of law."
[Flagg Bros, 436 U.S. at] 160 n.10. This language, in context, can be read as denying
not that the statute was state action, but merely that it was action sufficient to impli-
cate the state in the private conduct it authorized, or that it was otherwise unconsti-
tutional.
The very fact that Rehnquist qualified his assertion by conceding that the case
might be different if the statute had authorized a breach of the peace, see id. 160 n.9,
suggests that he may have been addressing the ultimate question of constitutionality
rather than the preliminary question of state action.
Goodman, supra note 102, at 1337 n.20. But see Brest, supra note 115, at 1301, 1315.
148. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 165.
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tions of the amendment extend to all action of the State...., 49
By enacting section 7-210, New York
merely announced [legislatively] the circumstances under which its
courts will not interfere with a private sale. Indeed, the crux of
respondents' complaint is not that the State has acted, but that it
has refused to act. This statutory refusal to act is no different from
an ordinary statute of limitations whereby the State declines to
provide a remedy for private deprivations of property after the pas-
sage of a given period of time. "°
Chief Justice Rehnquist certainly viewed the state's codified policy deci-
sion not to intervene in such disputes to be state action, but he perceived
the constitutionality of such a decision unquestionable.15' Thus viewing
the constitutionality of the statute as beyond contradiction, Chief Justice
Rehnquist apparently turned to Brooks' only remaining avenue of consti-
149. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880)).
150. Id. at 166 (emphasis in original); see also Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)
(discusses the constitutionality of statutes of limitation).
151. Chief Justice Rehnquist analogized § 7-210 to statutes of limitation, which he plainly
viewed as state action that is nonetheless constitutional. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 166. In
Texaco, Ina v. Short, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court,
which upheld an Indiana statute against due process attack. The statute in Short provided that
a severed mineral interest that is not used for twenty years automatically lapses and reverts to
the current surface owner unless the mineral owner files a statement of claim within the
twenty-year period. The Court upheld the statute against due process attack without consider-
ing whether it constituted state action. Short, 454 U.S. at 530-31.
Relying on Short, Chief Justice Rehnquist also would have upheld the statute attacked in
Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), in which the Court
struck down an Oklahoma statute that barred claims against the estate of a deceased debtor if
they were not presented to the estate's executor within two months of the publication of notice
of the commencement of probate proceedings. Id. at 492-94 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For
additional discussion of Pope, see infra notes 329-41 and accompanying text.
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to use the term "state action" to refer not to an
act done by or attributable to the state, but to an act done by or attributable to the state that
unconstitutionally deprives an individual of life, liberty, property, or equal protection of the
laws. In Pope, for example, he states: "Why there is 'state action' in [Pope], but not in [Short],
remains a mystery. .. ." Pope, 485 U.S. at 493. In fact, there was no holding in Short that
"state action" in the literal sense was lacking. Short simply held that the statute, which was a
state act, was constitutional because the statute itself did not deprive mineral owners of prop-
erty without due process of law. Short, 454 U.S. at 531-38. Although the mineral owners lost
their property, the loss resulted from their own inaction and the operation of a duly enacted
and constitutionally sound statute limiting the duration of certain property interests. Id. at
530-31. Likewise, there is no question that the enactment of the Oklahoma "non-claim stat-
ute" in Pope was state action, but the statute, Chief Justice Rehnquist contended, only defined
the duration of a creditor's property interest in a right of action. Pope, 485 U.S. at 492-94.
While Chief Justice Rehnquist views the enactment of a statute to be state action, he merely
views statutes that prospectively define property interests as manifestly constitutional. When a
plaintiff has lost property and attacks such a statute, Chief Justice Rehnquist describes the case
as lacking "state action" if the statute is either constitutional or does not cause the property
loss. He does not mean that the statute is not subject to the restrictions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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tutional attack, her argument that Flagg Brothers' conduct was itself
state action.
The state's inaction, or more accurately, the state's decision not to
intervene in private disputes or otherwise interfere with private conduct,
is state action in the literal sense. It is a decision made by the state's
courts and legislatures, and that decision is subject to the restraints of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This decision, however, is unlikely to violate
the Due Process Clause except in those rare circumstances in which the
state has an affirmative constitutional obligation to protect individuals
from privately infficted harm, if any such circumstances exist. 52 Like-
wise, the state's decision not to interfere with certain private conduct
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause if it is uniformly applied to
all individuals.
D. Governmentally Regulated Private Conduct as State Action
Whether enacted as legislation, established by judicial decision, or
promulgated by executive agencies, direct governmental regulation of
private conduct is state action subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.153
The Amendment's applicability becomes more difficult, however, when a
litigant challenges on constitutional grounds not the regulations but the
actions of a private entity that is subject to the regulations. Challenges to
governmentally regulated private conduct have forced the Court to de-
cide whether and under what circumstances a private entity's actions
constitute state action when the private entity's activities are subject to
governmental regulation.154
Several decisions during the last twenty years clearly state that the
actions of a private entity are not state action subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment just because the entity is subject to general state regulation,
even if the regulations are pervasive.15 5 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
152. .See supra notes 11, 114.
153. Government regulation may take the form of specific directives compelling individuals
to behave in certain ways, or it may take the form of sanctions or incentives to induce individu-
als to behave in certain ways. The direct operation of such regulations is state action in the
same way that the overt acts of government officials are state action. See supra notes 46-59 and
accompanying text. The regulations are created by the government's official policy-making
bodies or by government agencies created by and acting pursuant to the policies of the official
policy-making bodies. They also are enforced by government enforcement officials. The direct
operation of governmental regulation of private activities, therefore, plainly is state action in
the purest sense.
154. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974); Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1972).
155. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841-42 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1004 (1982); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-51; Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 176-77.
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Co.,156 one of the most often cited decisions articulating this rule,15 ap-
plied the rule to an electric utility's actions. The plaintiff in Jackson al-
leged that the defendant electric utility violated the Due Process Clause
by disconnecting her electric service for nonpayment of her bill without
providing a hearing. 5 Conceding that the state subjected the utility to
"extensive and detailed" regulation, the Court held that "[t]he mere fact
that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its
action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 9 Although the actions of such heavily regulated industries per-
haps will be more readily deemed state action, the Court continued, the
general regulatory scheme alone does not suffice to make them so.
Rather, there must be "a sufficiently close nexus between the State and
the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' 'l 6° In the context
of treating governmentally regulated private entities as state action,
1 61
this nexus requirement means that the governmental regulations must in
some way involve the state directly in the challenged activity.162
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn 163 may be the Court's most trouble-free ap-
plication of this rule.16 The defendants in that case were a private
156. 419 U.S. 345.
157. See, ag., Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
158. The plaintiff contended that the Due Process Clause entitled her to notice, a hearing,
and an opportunity to pay any amounts found to be due before the company could terminate
her service. She sought an injunction requiring the defendant company to provide electric
service until it afforded her those procedures. She also sought damages for the previous termi-
nation of service. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 347-48.
159. Id. at 350.
160. Id. at 351.
161. The "nexus" requirement likely applies to any theory of state action. See McCoy,
supra note 72, at 817-26.
162. If the Court were to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to private business enterprises
solely because they are subject to state regulation, the Court in effect would be substituting "a
court-made scheme of federal constitutional regulation" for the state's regulatory scheme.
Burke & Reber, supra note 2, at 1093. This result would transfer regulatory authority not only
from the state to the federal government, but from state political entities to the federal judici-
ary. Id.
163. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
164. Even Jackson's application of the rule was problematic. The Court either rejected or
did not address arguments that the state in fact was involved directly with the challenged
conduct. The defendant utility submitted a tariff to the regulatory agencies. This tariff de-
scribed the termination procedure that the Jackson plaintiff later challenged. By taking no
action regarding the termination provision, the state regulatory agency arguably approved the
provision that went into effect 60 days after the tariff was filed. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 370
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Phillips, supra note 1, at 704. Although a state's failure to
prohibit private conduct is entirely constitutional in most contexts, see supra notes 109-14 and
accompanying text, such a conspicuous failure to regulate "a particular practice becomes an
affirmative state action rather than simple inactivity" when it occurs in the context of a perva-
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school and its officials. The school specialized in helping students with
difficulties completing public high school. State agencies referred most of
the students to the school, and state funds accounted for most of the
school's budget. 6 In addition, a variety of governmental agencies ex-
tensively regulated a wide range of the school's activities.166 Nonethe-
less, the Court held that the school's discharge of the plaintiff, a
counselor at the school, was not state action because the state's extensive
regulations did not regulate such personnel matters as the discharge of
counselors. 167 The Court therefore deems private conduct to be state ac-
tion on the basis of state regulation only if the state's regulations involve
the state in or directly impact upon the challenged activity itself.1 68
Although it is unclear precisely what level or type of regulatory in-
volvement is necessary to make private conduct state action, private con-
duct apparently constitutes state action at least when the state compels
the private conduct.1 69 In Peterson v. Greenville,1 70 for example, the
Court held that the state was responsible for a restaurant owner's deci-
sion not to serve blacks, because a city ordinance required racial segrega-
tion in public eating places.1 71 Because the restaurant's management
"did precisely what the city law required," the initiative for the discrimi-
sive regulatory scheme such as that imposed on an electric utility. McCoy, supra note 72, at
813. Professor McCoy explains:
As a practical matter, . . . state prohibition [of private conduct] is the exception;
freedom of the individual to choose among a wide range of courses of conduct, even
those considered undesirable by most people, is the conceptual norm .... On the
other hand, the public utility company is routinely subject to detailed and pervasive
state regulation in all aspects of its operation, including the most central element of
its existence, the profit margin. For the utility company, restriction of its range of
choices by the state is commonly perceived as the norm rather than the exception; in
a sense, regulation is the conceptual "state of nature" for a utility company that
enjoys a state-protected monopoly.... In the context of such a [pervasive] regulatory
scheme, a decision not to prohibit a utility from engaging in a particular practice
becomes an affirmative state action rather than simple inactivity. Unlike the usual
case of legislative inaction, such selective regulatory inaction may represent a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 812-13.
165. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 832.
166. Id. at 848-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 841-42. But see id. at 846-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state
did regulate personnel matters).
168. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 839, 841;
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-51.
169. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1972) (regulation requiring
private clubs to adhere to their by-laws held to violate the Equal Protection Clause as applied
to Moose Lodge No. 107 because its by-laws called for racial discrimination in its guest
policies).
170. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
171. Id. at 247-48.
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nation came from the state. The Court concluded that such state im-
posed segregation clearly violated the Equal Protection Clause.1 72
Although no recent decisions have held private conduct to be state
action on the basis of state regulation, state regulation of private conduct
apparently may still result in private conduct's being deemed state ac-
tion. The Court has never overruled Peterson and continues to cite it
with approval.17 The Court's opinions, however, concentrate on defin-
ing the limits of the state action by regulation theory. In Blum v. Yaret-
sky, 74 the Court stated that "a State normally can be held responsible
for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." '17 5 These opinions
indicate that the Court will treat private conduct as state action if the
state compels the conduct or significantly encourages the conduct in
some way. Because no recent decision has found state action based on
such regulatory involvement, however, it is difficult to predict what level
of involvement might satisfy the Court's test. 176
Indeed, the Blum decision raises doubt that any regulation short of
a specific directive to perform the challenged action or to make the chal-
lenged decision will suffice to treat the activity as state action. The plain-
tiffs in Blum were Medicaid patients who were involuntarily discharged
from nursing homes or transferred from one level of nursing home care
to another. 177 They alleged that the decisions of their nursing homes to
172. Id. at 248. The Court also found state action based on lesser state involvement in
several other "sit-in" cases in the early 1960s. For a review of these decisions and their state
action analysis, see Burke & Reber, supra note 2, at 1082-84.
173. See Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 173.
174. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
175. Id. at 1004; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) (finds no state action on the ground that
the state in no way put its "imprimatur" on the challenged practice of the defendant); Moose
Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 176-77 ("However detailed this type of regulation may be in some
particulars, it cannot be said to in any way foster or encourage [the private defendant's] racial
discrimination.").
176. Cf Phillips, supra note 1, at 704, 715-16 (discussing the Court's decisions in Jackson
and Blum, notes that the nexus between the state regulation and the challenged activity appar-
ently "must be close indeed").
177. Blum, 457 U.S. at 995. The Medicaid program, established by 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976
ed. & Supp. IV) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1990)), provides federal funding to states
that reimburse certain medical costs incurred by the poor. In order to receive federal funds
under Medicaid, participating states must assist eligible persons needing "skilled nursing facili-
ties." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(13)(B), 1396d(a)(4)(A). The program provides additional funds
to states that also assist poor persons needing "intermediate care facility services." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(a)(15); see § 1396d(c), (f). New York chose to participate in both parts of the pro-
gram. Blum, 457 U.S. at 993-94. It thus
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discharge or transfer them violated the Due Process Clause because they
were not provided notice or an opportunity for a hearing. 178 The nursing
homes made the transfer decisions only because New York and federal
Medicaid regulations require periodic assessment of whether Medicaid
recipients are receiving the appropriate level of care. The regulations re-
quired the nursing homes to " 'maintain a discharge planning program to
... document that the facility has made and is continuing to make all
efforts possible to transfer patients to the appropriate level of care or
home as indicated by the patient's medical condition or needs.' "179
Moreover, the nursing homes are subject to sanctions if they fail to assign
Medicaid patients to the level of care the State deems appropriate.180 As
Justice Brennan points out18 ' and the Court concedes,18 2 the purpose of
all these regulations and procedures, including the multiple levels of
nursing home care, the need assessments, and the transfer decisions, is to
control and reduce the cost of the Medicaid program to the state. The
nursing homes would not make the assessments or initiate the transfers
but for the state regulations requiring them to do so to serve the state
objective of controlling Medicaid costs. 83
The Court nonetheless held that the nursing homes' decisions to
transfer the plaintiffs to another level of care was not state action because
the "decisions ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private
parties according to professional standards that are not established by the
provides Medicaid assistance to eligible persons who receive care in private nursing
homes, which are designated as either "skilled nursing facilities" (SNFs) or "health
related facilities" (HRFs). The latter provide less extensive, and generally less expen-
sive, medical care than the former.... [Flederal regulations require each nursing
home to establish a utilization review committee (URC) of physicians... [who must]
periodically assess[ ] whether each patient is receiving the appropriate level of care,
and thus whether the patient's continued stay in the facility is justified.... If the
URC determines that the patient should be discharged or transferred to a different
level of care ... it must notify the state agency responsible for administering Medi-
caid assistance.
Id. at 994-95.
The named plaintiffs in Blum challenged URC decisions to transfer them to lower level
care facilities, but a consent decree resolved the dispute with respect to such transfers initiated
by URCs. The remaining issue that the Supreme Court addressed was "whether there is state
action and a constitutional right to a pre-transfer evidentiary hearing in a patient transfer to a
higher level care facility and/or a patient transfer initiated by the facility or its agents [as
distinguished from one initiated by a URC]." Id. at 997-98 (citations omitted).
178. Blum, 457 U.S. 993.
179. Id. at 1018 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
10, § 416.9(d)(1) (1980)). Also quoting this regulation, the majority acknowledged this state-
imposed duty of the nursing homes. Id. at 1006-10.
180. Id. at 1018 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1010-11.
181. Id. at 1018, 1026-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1008 n.19.
183. Id.; see also id. at 1015, 1018-19, 1029 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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State."1 84 Thus, "while the State commands the making of some deci-
sion,. . sets general criteria for that decision," and imposes sanctions for
making the decision incorrectly, "it still is not responsible for the specific
decision made, which inevitably turns on an independent medical judg-
ment." '185 If the state's regulatory role in Blum was insufficient to make
the nursing homes' transfer decisions state action, it is difficult to imagine
any state regulatory involvement or encouragement short of a specific
directive to make a specific decision or perform a specific act that would
result in a finding of state action.
Whatever level of state regulatory involvement is required to deem
the action of a regulated entity state action, state action exists only be-
cause of the state regulatory involvement. Unless the private conduct is
an exclusive function of the sovereign"' or is one of those exceptional, if
existent, private activities that the state has an affirmative constitutional
duty to prevent,1 87 the private entity is free to engage in the challenged
conduct on its own initiative. '88 In effect, therefore, the state regula-
tion-not the private conduct pursuant to the regulation-is the state
action.'89 This distinction significantly affects the remedy that is appro-
priate when such state action is found to exist and to violate the Four-
teenth Amendment. A plaintiff certainly should be entitled to damages
caused by the impact of the unconstitutional regulation. Any prospective
injunction, however, should prohibit only the enforcement of the uncon-
stitutional regulation. The private entity should not be enjoined from
engaging in the challenged conduct because the conduct is not state ac-
tion if performed at the sole initiative of the private entity free from the
influence of the offending regulation.' 90
In summary, private activities or decisions are state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment at least when state regulations specifically com-
pel the challenged action or decision. In articulating the test for deter-
mining when such state regulation will subject private action to the
184. Id. at 1008.
185. Phillips, supra note 1, at 715-16 (emphasis in original).
186. See infra notes 220-67 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
188. See McCoy, supra note 72, at 811.
189. Id.
190. Id. Professor McCoy has noted that although the "Court has never unambiguously
enjoined private activity as a violation of the fourteenth amendment solely on the ground that
the state had required... the activity," the Court seems to accept the assumption that such a
result is possible. Id. at 809. Nonetheless, the "Court conspicuously failed to implement the
assumption when the opportunity arose near the end of the Moose Lodge opinion.... [T]he
Court merely enjoined enforcement of the regulation, leaving the licensee free to act as it
chose." Id. at 811 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972)).
restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has indicated that
some lower level of state involvement in the challenged conduct-such as
significant encouragement-might suffice. 191 The Court's application of
the tests, however, leave little room for any lower level of involvement.
Whatever level of regulatory involvement is necessary, the Court should
only award damages and enjoin the regulation's enforcement if state ac-
tion is found to exist as a result of state regulation. The private entity's
actions are not by themselves state action, and the private entity gener-
ally remains free to engage in the challenged conduct in the absence of
state influence.
E. Joint Participation with State Officials as State Action
Several Supreme Court opinions recognize a "joint participation" or
"symbiosis" theory of state action.'92 Under this theory, state action ex-
ists if the state becomes so intertwined with a private enterprise that it is
deemed to be a partner or joint participant in the enterprise. Because
this approach to state action, more than any other, depends upon "sifting
[the] facts and weighing [the] circumstances"' 93 of each case to evaluate
the cumulative impact of all the ties between the state and the private
entity, the boundaries of this theory are unclear.' 94
The Court originated the joint participation theory in Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority.195 In Burton, a privately operated restaurant
refused to serve the plaintiff because of his race. The plaintiff claimed
that the restaurant's discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the state was not involved in
the restaurant's decision not to serve the plaintiff, the Court held that the
restaurant's discrimination was state action because of the state's close
ties to the restaurant. 196 The Court based this conclusion on the cumula-
tive effect of the state's ties to the restaurant as opposed to any single
determinative fact. "The State ha[d] so far insinuated itself into a posi-
tion of interdependence with [the restaurant], that it must be recognized
as a joint participant in the challenged activity."' 97 The restaurant was
191. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
192. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982); Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010-11; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 357-58 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 172-74.
193. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
194. See McCoy, supra note 72, at 809 n.98; cf Burton, 365 U.S. at 728 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
195. 365 U.S. 715. Chief Justice Rehnquist later named the theory "symbiosis" in Moose
Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S at 175.
196. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723-26.
197. Id. at 725.
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located in a parking building owned and operated by the Wilmington
Parking Authority, a state agency, and it leased its space from the Park-
ing Authority. The land was purchased and the building constructed
with public funds. 198 In fact, the Parking Authority leased part of the
building to commercial enterprises like the restaurant specifically to pro-
vide sufficient capital to finance the parking facility. 199 Moreover, the
restaurant and the Parking Authority received mutual benefits from their
relationship. While the parking facility provided convenient parking for
the restaurant's patrons, the restaurant increased demand for the parking
facility.2c ° Any improvements made by the restaurant enjoyed the Park-
ing Authority's tax exemption. Perhaps most importantly, the Court de-
termined that the Parking Authority benefitted from the restaurant's
racial discrimination and that the "profits earned by discrimination"
were indeed "indispensable" to the Parking Authority's financial suc-
cess.201 The Court held that
addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities of
the Authority, the benefits mutually conferred, together with the
obvious fact that the restaurant is operated as an integral part of a
public building devoted to a public parking service, indicates that
degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory ac-
tion which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to
condemn.2 °2
Perhaps because of the theory's ambiguity, the Court has not really
used it to find state action since deciding Burton.2 °3 The Burger Court's
state action decisions discuss Burton often at length, but they distinguish
it and find no state action.2°  Although the Court's refusal to find state
action on the basis of Burton appears to be correct in many of the Burger
Court's decisions, the Court's failure to find state action in Blum v.
Yaretsky2 °5 casts doubt on the theory's viability.
198. Id. at 723.
199. Id. at 719.
200. Id at 724.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. McCoy, supra note 72, at 808. The Court has cited and discussed Burton in most of
its state action decisions, but in most it has not found state action to exist in the challenged
conduct. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1010 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830, 842 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-58 (1974); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172-74 (1972). The Court did cite Burton approvingly in
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375, 379-80 (1967), in which it found state action present,
but the Court did not base its state action finding on the Burton symbiosis theory of state
action. Id. at 380. The Court also decided Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), in a manner
similar to Burton. See id. at 301.
204. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358-59; Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 172-74.
205. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
Blum best illustrates the Burger Court's reluctance to apply the
joint participation theory of state action. The plaintiffs in Blum con-
tended that their nursing homes' decisions to transfer them to a lower
level of care violated due process because the homes made the decisions
without giving the plaintiffs adequate notice or hearing.20 6 The plaintiffs
argued that the nursing homes' decisions were state action because of the
close ties and symbiotic relationship between the state and the nursing
homes.20v In addition to licensing and regulating the facilities, the state's
Medicaid program2 °0 paid the medical expenses of more than ninety per-
cent of the patients in the facilities.209 Because the Medicaid patients
could not afford the homes' services themselves, the facilities, to a consid-
erable extent, owed their economic existence, or at least much of their
financial success, to the state funding program. The state also benefitted
from the nursing homes' activities, including specifically the challenged
transfer decisions. The nursing homes transfer patients only because
Medicaid regulations require them periodically to assess the medical
need of their patients and to transfer them to the appropriate level of
care.210 The assessment and transfer take place solely to control and re-
duce the cost of the state's Medicaid program.2"' The nursing homes
thus receive additional patients and income because of the Medicaid pro-
gram, and the state receives a system of cost control administered by the
private nursing homes at the state's insistence. Although the relationship
between the state and the nursing homes is similar to that between a
regulatory agency and a regulated industry, the state funding, the mutual
benefits, and the state-required need assessment and transfer decisions
make the state at least as much of a joint participant in the challenged
decisions of the nursing homes as the Parking Authority was in Burton.
The Court, however, held that state action did not exist under the
joint participation theory.212 Without reviewing the aggregate impact of
the many contacts between the state and the nursing homes, the Court
simply stated:
As we have previously held, privately owned enterprises providing
services that the State would not necessarily provide, even though
206. Blum, 457 U.S. at 996.
207. Id. at 1010-1I.
208. For a brief summary of this program, see supra note 177.
209. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011.
210. Id. at 1008 n.19; see also id. at 1015, 1018-19, 1029 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1008 n.19; see also id. at 1014-17, 1026-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. The Court also rejected other theories of state action as inapplicable. It held that the
state's regulation of the nursing homes, including its requirement that they make the chal-
lenged need assessments and transfer decisions, did not make the transfer decision state action.
Id. at 1004; see supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
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they are extensively regulated, do not fall within the ambit of Bur-
ton.... That programs undertaken by the State result in substan-
tial funding of the activities of a private entity is no more
persuasive than the fact of regulation of such an entity in demon-
strating that the State is responsible for decisions made by the en-
tity in the course of its business.2"'
The Court ignored the state's symbiotic relationship with the nursing
homes and the fact that the challenged decision was made at the insis-
tence of the state solely for its own benefit.2" 4 Although the facts in
Blum appear to fit into Burton's state action theory, the Court firmly
refused to use that theory.21
Despite the Burger Court's reluctance to apply or faithfully analyze
Burton's joint participation theory of state action, the Court has not
overruled Burton.2" 6 Even Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions discuss the
joint participation theory sometimes at length before holding it inapplica-
ble.2" 7 The theory thus remains applicable at least to cases with facts
specifically paralleling those in Burton. The joint participation theory
also remains available for later Courts to resurrect as a basis for finding
state action whenever a majority of Justices find sufficient "factual bits
and pieces" to make Burton's "vague generalization."2 ' Indeed, several
213. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011. The decisions challenged in Blum were hardly made "in the
course of [the nursing home's] business." The challenged transfer decisions were made pursu-
ant to state regulatory requirements to serve the state's policy interest of controlling the costs
of its Medicaid program. Id. at 1026-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The nursing homes would
not have made the transfer decisions if the plaintiffs had been paying their own costs. If a
paying patient requests to stay at a facility that provides a high level of care, one must assume
that the private, profit-seeking facility would be most happy to oblige, even if the facility did
not believe the patient needed the level of care it provided. As the Court concedes in another
part of its opinion, the transfer decision takes place solely at the state's insistence to serve the
state's interest. Id. at 1008 n.19.
214. See id at 1008; see also id at 1014-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting); supra notes 208-11
and accompanying text.
215. As the Court had done in several previous cases, it refused to evaluate the ties between
the state and the nursing homes in the aggregate. It instead analyzed the various contacts
seriatim. Schneider, supra note 1, at 1164-66; see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 349-64 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
216. The Blum Court came the closest to explicitly criticizing the joint participation the-
ory. The Court characterized the plaintiff's argument as "the rather vague generalization that
such a relationship exists between the State and the nursing homes it regulates that the State
may be considered a joint participant in the homes' discharge and transfer decisions." Blum,
457 U.S. at 1010. Relying as it does on "sifting facts and weighing circumstances," Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), that sort of "vague generalization" is
precisely what the Court relied upon in Burton.
217. See, eg., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 174-77 (1972).
218. See R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG & J. NOWAK, supra note 14, at 184-85; McCoy, supra
note 71, at 809 n.98.
Justices have resurrected the theory.219
F. Assumption of State Powers: The Government Function Theory of
State Action
Each of the state action theories discussed to this point require some
governmental involvement. The difficulty in applying the Fourteenth
Amendment to these latter cases lies not in the absence of official activity
but in distinguishing the state's actions from the private conduct to
which it relates. These applications of the state action doctrine, there-
fore, do not depart substantially from the state action doctrine that
originated in the Civil Rights Cases.220
In a line of decisions beginning with Marsh v. Alabama,21 however,
the Supreme Court recognized a government function theory of state ac-
tion that radically departs from earlier notions of state action. Under
this theory, private entities are subject to fourteenth amendment re-
straints when they undertake functions or assume powers that the gov-
ernment ordinarily performs or exercises. 22 Unlike the state action
theories discussed above, the government function doctrine permits the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to private conduct in which
there is no official involvement.
Marsh, the first case that clearly applied the government function
theory,223 arose from the attempts of a Jehovah's Witness to distribute
religious literature on the sidewalks of Chickasaw, Alabama, a company
town owned by Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. After she refused to stop
distributing the literature and to leave the town, company officials had
her arrested for trespassing.224 State courts convicted her, and she ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court re-
versed her conviction. The Court first noted that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a state or municipality from stopping
the distribution of literature as the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation had
219. See infra notes 425-36 and accompanying text.
220. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
221. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
222. See McCoy, supra note 72, at 796; Phillips, supra note 1, at 690-91.
223. Seeds of a government function theory of state action may be found in several of the
earlier White Primary Cases, in which the Court opened up black participation in party prima-
ies, but "it made its first definite appearance" in Marsh. Phillips, supra note 1, at 690-91 &
n.36. For a discussion of the White Primary Cases in this context, see Schneider, supra note
78, at 746-52, in which Professor Schneider analyzes the state action rulings in Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932), Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
224. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503-04.
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done.2 25 The values underlying these two Amendments, the Court indi-
cated, apply to the actions of Gulf Shipbuilding in its company town with
the same force that they apply to any other town.22 6 The Court deter-
mined that the town functioned no differently from any other town and
then stated that: "Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or pos-
sesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the
functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of com-
munication remain free."'2 27 Because Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation as-
sumed the essentially "public function" of operating an entire town
including streets, sewers, residential buildings, and a business block
freely accessible and open to the public, 228 the Court held the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the town's corporate managers from
"[curtailing] the liberty of press and religion" of the town residents.229
During the twenty years following Marsh, the Court relied on
Marsh and its reasoning to apply constitutional restrictions to private
conduct in several other contexts. In Terry v. Adams, 230 the Court found
that primary elections held by private political associations constituted
state action subject to the Fifteenth Amendment. 23 1 Although no opin-
ion commanded a majority of the Terry Court, several Justices appar-
ently based their decision on the premise that the private political
association assumed the traditional government function of conducting
elections for public office, thereby subjecting itself to constitutional re-
straints.232 The Court held in Evans v. Newton 233 that the operation of a
public park is a government function and, therefore, that the private op-
225. Id. at 504.
226. See iL at 507-09.
227. Id at 507.
228. Significantly, the company assumed these governmental roles on its own initiative.
The state had no role in the company's undertaking these functions other than not intervening
to regulate or stop it. The state certainly did not affirmatively or formally delegate the tasks to
the company. The Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to the company's activities,
therefore, entirely on the basis of the company's independent actions without regard to the
lack of state involvement.
229. Id. at 502, 508. Marsh may be interpreted as holding that the state court's involve-
ment in the Jehovah's Witness trespass conviction was the state action that violated the Four-
teenth Amendment. Subsequent judicial readings as well as most academic interpretations of
Marsh, however, focus on the actions of Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation in assuming a role
normally performed by the government as the determinative factor implicating the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158-59 (1978); G. GUNTHER, supra
note 78, at 988-89; McCoy, supra note 72, at 797 n.44; Phillips, supra note 1, at 692 & n.44.
230. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
231. Id.
232. McCoy, supra note 72, at 797; see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
352 (1974).
233. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
eration of a segregated park violated the Equal Protection Clause.234 In
Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza,235 the Court's most
far-reaching application of the government function doctrine, the Court
held that a shopping center is "the functional equivalent to the business
district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh" and thus is subject to certain
first and fourteenth amendment restraints.236 By undertaking the func-
tion of maintaining common areas, parking lots, and driveways in shop-
ping centers, which were replacing downtown business districts
throughout the country, the Court reasoned, the shopping center owners
assumed a function traditionally performed by municipal govern-
ments.237 The Court accordingly held that the First Amendment prohib-
ited the owners from excluding members of the public seeking to exercise
first amendment rights on the shopping center premises, at least when
the ideas they wished to convey were related to the shopping center.238
No Supreme Court decision since Logan Valley has used the govern-
ment function theory to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to private
conduct. Indeed, the Court restricted the potentially broad application
of the government function theory espoused in Logan Valley. Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner2 39 limited Logan Valley, and Hudgens v. NLRB 240 then
overruled it, holding that a shopping center's refusal to permit the distri-
bution of literature on its premises is not state action subject to the Four-
teenth Amendment.24 1 The Court further clarified the government
function theory in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.242 and Flagg Bros.
v. Brooks.243
234. Id. at 302. But see Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 n.8 (1978) (Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist expresses doubt that Newton intended to establish "that the
operation of a park for recreational purposes is an exclusively public function.").
235. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
236. Id. at 318.
237. See id. at 319.
238. Id. at 319-20.
239. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
240. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
241. The Court in Hudgens distinguished privately owned and operated shopping centers
from the company town in Marsh. Unlike the shopping centers in Logan Valley, Lloyd Corp.,
and Hudgens, the Court noted, the private business corporation in Marsh assumed "all of the
attributes of a state-created municipality[,] . . . performing the full spectrum of municipal
powers and [standing] in the shoes of the State." Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 519. For additional
discussion of the Court's treatment of the government function doctrine in Hudgens and Lloyd
Corp., see McCoy, supra note 72, at 799-800 ("A literal reading of Hudgens and Lloyd indi-
cates that the private party must assume all of the functions of a municipal or state govern-
ment before it would be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment in the performance of those
functions.").
242. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
243. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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In Jackson, the Court explained that in order for the government
function theory to subject the activities of a private defendant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, the private entity must "exercise... powers
traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." 2" The Court explained
that a private entity is not subject to the restraints of the Fourteenth
Amendment just because its activities are "'affected with the public in-
terest.' "24 Likewise, "'the fact that government has engaged in a par-
ticular activity does not necessarily mean that an individual entrepreneur
or manager of the same kind of undertaking suffers the same constitu-
tional inhibitions.' ,,246 The Court then held that Metropolitan Edison's
provision of electric power was not state action under the government
function theory even though its enterprise was "affected with the public
interest" and even though many municipal governments operate electric
utilities.2 47 The operation of an electric utility and the provision of elec-
tric power to consumers, the Court noted, are "not traditionally the ex-
clusive prerogative of the State."24 The utility's decision to terminate a
customer's service without providing a hearing, therefore, was not state
action under the government function doctrine and was not subject to
fourteenth amendment due process constraints.
The Court addressed the government function theory at greater
length in Flagg Bros., again focusing on the theory's exclusivity require-
ment. As discussed above,24 9 Brooks, the plaintiff in Flagg Bros., con-
tended that the defendant Flagg Brothers' sale of her belongings without
a hearing violated the Fourteenth Amendment. She argued that Flagg
Brothers was imposing a resolution to their dispute and such dispute res-
olution is traditionally an exclusive function of government.250 Flagg
Brother's threatened sale, she argued, thus was state action under the
government function theory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 251
The Court held that Flagg Brothers' proposed sale of Brooks' prop-
erty pursuant to the state law was not state action under the government
function theory.2 52 The Court noted that Marsh v. Alabama25 3 and
244. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352.
245. Id. at 353.
246. Id. at 354 n.9 (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966)).
247. Id. at 353.
248. Id.
249. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
250. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1974).
251. Id. at 168 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252. The Court also rejected Brooks' argument that Flagg Brothers' actions were state
action because they were authorized or encouraged by the state's enacting N.Y. U.C.C. § 7-
210 (McKinney 1964), pursuant to which Flagg Brothers sold her belongings. See supra notes
138-51 and accompanying text.
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Terry v. Adams,25a the Court's only prior applications of the government
function theory that remained viable,255 "have in common the feature of
exclusivity.... [T]he elections held by the Democratic Party and its
affiliates were the only meaningful elections in Texas, and the streets
owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp. were the only streets in Chicka-
saw .... 2 6 In contrast, the Court stated, "the proposed sale by Flagg
Brothers under § 7-210 is not the only means of resolving [the] purely
private dispute" between Brooks and Flagg Brothers.25 7 The Flagg Bros.
Court apparently held that in order for a private entity's activities to be
deemed state action under the government function theory, the activity
must be one traditionally undertaken exclusively by the sovereign and it
must substantially displace the government's traditional role in that ac-
tivity.258 Flagg Brothers' sale of Brooks' belongings met neither of these
requirements. While Flagg Brothers' sale of Brooks' belongings may
253. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
254. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
255. The Court noted that Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968), had been overruled and expressed doubt that Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966), was based on a government function theory. Klagg Bros, 436 U.S. 159 & n.8.
256. Flagg Bros, 436 U.S. at 159-60.
257. Id. at 160.
258. McCoy, supra note 72, at 801; see also Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159-64. Some com-
mentators have noted that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Flagg Bros. "seems to waver
between two rather different conceptions of 'exclusivity.'" Phillips, supra note 1, at 707 n. 128;
see also Schneider, supra note 78, at 778-79. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974), established the requirement that the function must be one that has been "traditionally
exclusively reserved to the state" in the sense that only the government performed the function
or exercised the power in question. Id at 352-53. The Court continued to impose this require-
ment in Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 148-60. The Flagg Bros. opinion, however, also discusses
"exclusivity" in the sense that "the private actor provides the 'exclusive' forum, channel, or
means for exercising a particular constitutional right." Phillips, supra note 1, at 707 n.128; see
Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159-60.
Rather than "wavering" between two conceptions of "exclusivity," Chief Justice Rehn-
quist added a requirement for the invocation of the government function theory. Not only
must the function assumed by the private actor be one "traditionally exclusively reserved to
the State," Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352, but the private actor's performance of the function must
also replace the state's performance of it. See McCoy, supra note 72, at 801. Thus, even
though the operation of elementary and secondary schools has become a traditional, arguably
exclusive governmental function, operators of parochial schools are not subject to the Four-
teenth Amendment. Under the government function doctrine, parochial schools do not oper-
ate to the exclusion of governmentally operated public schools. If, however, a county were to
close down its public schools and pay for its citizens to attend local parochial schools instead,
the parochial schools then might be subject to fourteenth amendment restrictions under the
government function doctrine. Compare Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354 n.9 (noting that parochial
schools are not necessarily subject to the Fourteenth Amendment even though they perform a
function "clothed with the public interest") with Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163-64 (suggesting
that states and municipalities have administered education with a relatively great degree of
exclusivity such that, under some circumstances, private educational institutions might be
deemed state action under the government function doctrine).
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have constituted a resolution to the parties' private dispute, a function
that government traditionally performs, various other private remedies
traditionally were available for resolving debtor-creditor disputes.25 9 The
state law resolution, therefore, was not a function that traditionally has
been the exclusive prerogative of government. Likewise, various judicial
remedies still existed for bailors in Brooks' position.2" Flagg Brothers'
assumption of the dispute resolution function could not be said to dis-
place the state's role in resolving private disputes. Because Flagg Broth-
ers' sale of Brooks' belongings pursuant to section 7-210 did not meet
these exclusivity requirements, the Court held that it was not state action
under the government function theory and thus could not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.261
Although the Court has not used the government function theory to
hold a private entity subject to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment since 1968, the Court's discussions of the theory in more recent
cases indicate that the theory remains viable.262 The Court has restricted
its application since the theory's broadest articulation in Amalgamated
Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza,263 but the Court apparently
would apply the theory if presented with a case that meets the theory's
259. Flagg Bros, 436 U.S. at 160. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist notes, for
example, that Brooks could have sought at the time she authorized the storage of her belong-
ings "a waiver of Flagg Brothers' right to sell her goods" to be included as part of the original
bailment contract. Id.
260. Id. "The challenged statute itself," the Court noted, "provides a damages remedy
against the warehouseman for a violation of its provisions." Id Likewise, the Court noted, a
bailor such as the appellee in the companion case to Flagg Bros. who claims that she never
authorized Flagg Brothers to store her property, can "replevy her goods at any time under
state law." Id.
261. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion said that New York's "system of rights and reme-
dies, recognizing the traditional place of private arrangements in ordering relationships in the
commercial world, can hardly be said to have delegated to Flagg Brothers an exclusive prerog-
ative of the sovereign." Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist perceived that disputes between debtors
and creditors and bailors and bailees were historically subject to a range of both private meth-
ods of resolution and a variety of judicial remedies. Flagg Brothers' actions to "resolve" pri-
vately its dispute with Brooks did not usurp a function that was traditionally the exclusive role
of government and did not replace the full range of state remedies. They accordingly could not
constitute state action under the government function theory.
A difficulty in applying the government function doctrine to Flagg Bros. lies in the Court's
and commentators' acceptance of Brooks's argument that Flagg Brothers performed a func-
tion of dispute resolution. In fact, the state resolved the dispute that Brooks had with Flagg
Brothers when it passed N.Y. U.C.C. § 7-210 (McKinney 1964); Brooks simply disliked the
state's resolution. The state basically sides with the warehouseman permitting the sale of bail-
ors' property without intervention. The state then leaves the bailor only a remedy for damages
if the warehouseman violates the statutory provisions.
262. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. 149; Jackson, 419 U.S. 345.
263. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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new, more restrictive requirements. 2" Indeed, the Court noted in Flagg
Bros. that "there are a number of state and municipal functions not cov-
ered by our election cases or governed by the reasoning of Marsh [V.
Alabama]265 which have been administered with a greater degree of ex-
clusivity by States and municipalities than has the function of so-called
'dispute resolution' [before the Court in Flagg Bros. ]."1266 In summary,
the Court likely would subject private activities to fourteenth amendment
restraints if: (1) the activities constitute a function that traditionally has
been performed only by government; and (2) the private entity's assump-
tion of the function substantially replaces the government's traditional
performance of the function.267
264. Rather than rejecting the theory outright, the Court merely has found the theory
inapplicable to the cases before it. See, ag., Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 160; Jackson, 419 U.S. at
353. The Court's opinions discuss the theory at length, refining rather than discarding it. See
Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 160; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353.
265. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
266. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163. The Court listed some examples of such functions as
education, fire and police protection, and tax collection. We express no view as to
the extent, if any, to which a city or State might be free to delegate to private parties
the performance of such functions and thereby avoid the strictures of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The mere recitation of these possible permutations and combinations
of factual situations suffices to caution us that their resolution should abide the neces-
sity of deciding them.
Id. at 164-65.
267. Even if these requirements are met, however, all of the private entity's actions would
not be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. Only those actions that are part of the perform-
ance of the traditionally exclusively governmental function would be subject to the Amend-
ment. McCoy, supra note 72, at 818-20. As Professor McCoy explains:
[T]he company town owner in Marsh v. Alabama was held to be acting as the state,
not in some abstract universal sense with respect to all individuals in all contexts, but
only in its dealings with those seeking to exercise freedom of speech in the town's
common areas. Only with respect to those plaintiffs and their specific interest did the
Court declare that the company had assumed a traditional role of state government
vis-i-vis its citizens.... It seems too clear to warrant argument, however, that the
Marsh holding did not mean that the town's company owner was acting as the state
subject to the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment in its manufacturing and
sales practices. The critical difference is that in its dealings with the consumers of
those activities, the company did not occupy the role of the state in a traditional
state-citizen relationship.
Id. at 819.
This limitation on the application of state action theories to hold private actors bound to
the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to the government function theory. There must be a
nexus between the defendant's specific activity that the plaintiff challenges and the theory of
state action by which the defendant can be said to be a state actor for fourteenth amendment
purposes. See generally McCoy, supra note 71.
Spring 1991]
634 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 18:587
HII. State Action Decisions of the Rehnquist Court
The Rehnquist Court has decided four major state action cases.2 68
The Court's decisions and the dissenting opinions in three of those cases
reflect shifts in the state action doctrine.269 This section analyzes these
three cases to shed light on the Rehnquist Court's direction in its devel-
opment of state action doctrine.
A. San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee27
0
The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 grants the United States Olympic
Committee (USOC), a federally chartered nonprofit corporation, the ex-
clusive right to use the word "Olympic" and various Olympic symbols
for commercial purposes.2 7 1 San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc.
(SFAA), a nonprofit California corporation, sought to hold an event
billed as the "Gay Olympic Games." To help finance the event, SFAA
sold shirts, buttons, and other merchandise bearing the phrase "Gay
Olympic Games. '2 72  After SFAA refused to stop using the word
"Olympics," the USOC ified an action in federal court to enjoin SFAA's
use of the word. Among its several defenses,2 73 SFAA contended that
the USOC's refusal to grant it a license to use "Olympics" violated the
Fifth Amendment.274 SFAA noted that the USOC licensed the use of
the word "Olympics" to organizations sponsoring the "Special Olym-
pics" and the "Junior Olympics. ' 2 75 Therefore, SFAA argued, the
USOC's refusal to permit the word's use for the "Gay Olympic Games"
denied SFAA equal protection of the laws.27 6
268. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Tulsa
Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
269. The Court had little disagreement about the second case, West, 487 U.S. 42, because it
concerned the activities of a prison doctor who performed his function as an independent
contractor. Because of a prison doctor's unique role, the Court held unanimously that his
conduct was state action.
270. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
271. See 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1988); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 526.
272. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 526.
273. In addition to its equal protection argument, SFAA contended: (1) that the Amateur
Sports Act granted the USOC only a traditional trademark and that SFAA could therefore use
the word because such use would not create confusion regarding any relation of the USOC to
SFAA's planned "Gay Olympic Games"; and (2) that Congress's granting exclusive rights to
the word violated the First Amendment. The Court rejected these contentions in a seven to
two majority. Id. at 528-40.
274. Id. at 542.
275. Id. at 542 n.22.
276. Although the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly ap-
plies only to the states, the Court construes the fifth amendment Due Process Clause, which is
With a majority of only five Justices, 77 the Court held that the
USOC's refusal to grant SFAA permission to use the word "Olympics"
was not state action and thus could not violate the Fifth Amendment.278
In an opinion similar to the many Burger Court opinions refusing to find
state action,279 Justice Powell rejected in laundry list fashion the possible
bases for finding state action. He stated that the USOC could not be a
state actor simply because it received a corporate charter, because the
federal government statutorily regulates it, or because Congress granted
it exclusive rights to use the word "Olympic."' 8 0
With little more discussion, the Court rejected the dissent's conten-
tion that the USOC's actions were state action under the government
function theory. Although the USOC clearly serves "a national inter-
est," Justice Powell wrote, "'[t]he fact [t]hat a private entity performs a
function which serves the public does not make its acts [governmental]
action.' "281 The opinion noted that the conduct and coordination of am-
ateur sports has long been performed entirely by private entities.2 82 In
fact, Congress enacted the Amateur Sports Act to alleviate "'the disor-
ganization and the serious factual disputes that seemed to plague ama-
teur sports in the United States' "283 by authorizing the USOC to
coordinate those traditionally private activities. Because the USOC's ac-
tivities traditionally were performed by private entities rather than the
government, the Court held that the USOC plainly was not a state actor
under the government function doctrine.284
applicable only to the federal government, to require the federal government to afford all citi-
zens equal protection of the laws. Id. at 542 n.21.
277. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Stevens, and White joined Part IV of
Justice Powell's opinion, which addressed the state action issue. Seven Justices, including Jus-
tices Blackmun and O'Connor in addition to the aforementioned Justices, joined the remainder
of the opinion.
278. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 542-47.
279. Compare Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982), and Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-59 (1974), with San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S.
522.
280. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 543-44.
281. Id. at 544 (quoting Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842).
282. Id. at 544-45.
283. Id. at 544 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1627, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978)).
284. The Court's treatment of the exclusivity requirement of the government function the-
ory focuses on the fact that the coordination of amateur sports has never been a function
performed only by the government. The opinion did not address the other aspect of "exclusiv-
ity" that Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978): the
apparent requirement that the activity of the purported governmental actor be the only outlet
for such activity. The Flagg Bros, Court held that Flagg Brothers did not serve an "exclu-
sively" governmental function partly because Flagg Brothers' sale of the plaintiff's belongings
was not the only mechanism available to resolve their dispute. Id. at 159-60; see supra note
257-61. The USOC's activities satisfy this "exclusivity" concept because one must go through
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Justice Powell also wrote that "[m]ost fundamentally, this Court has
held that a government 'normally can be held responsible for a private
decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such
significant encouragement ... that the choice must in law be deemed to
be that of the [government].' "285 The Court reasoned that because the
record contained no evidence that the government had coerced or en-
couraged the USOC's challenged decision to disallow SFAA's use of the
word "Olympics," that decision was not state action.286 The Court did
not make clear whether this coercion-encouragement requirement was an
independent theory of state action, whether it applied to the government
function theory of state action, or whether it applied to all the state ac-
tion theories.287
Finally, the Court rejected in a footnote the dissent's finding that the
government was a joint participant in the USOC's actions.288 Appar-
ently applying the coercion-encouragement requirement,289 the Court
found that nothing in the record "demonstrate[d] that the Federal Gov-
ermnent can or does exert any influence" over the USOC's actions to
license or prevent use of the word "Olympics. '290 "[T]his type of 'close
nexus between the [Government] and the challenged action of the
[USOC]'" is required in order for the USOC to be deemed a joint par-
ticipant with the government.291
the USOC to participate in the Olympics or various other international competitions over
which the USOC has jurisdiction. Even if the USOC's actions in conducting and coordinating
American competition in international athletics were deemed to be state action, however, that
result would not mean necessarily that all actions of the USOC are state action. See supra note
267; McCoy, supra note 72, at 819.
285. San Fransisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 546 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1004 (1982)).
286. Id. at 547.
287. Application of this requirement to all theories of state action would radically curtail
the state action doctrine. The requirement plainly would preclude application of the symbiosis
theory as it was conceived in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), be-
cause the Wilmington Parking Authority certainly did not coerce or encourage the Eagle
Cafe's decision not to serve blacks. The requirement would eliminate the concept of the gov-
ernment function theory expressed in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), because the
state of Alabama did not coerce or encourage Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation's decision to
prohibit Jehovah's Witnesses from distributing literature in the streets of its company town.
288. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 547 n.29.
289. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
290. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 547 n.29. The USOC could have decided
to permit everyone or no one to use its symbols. It decided without government influence to
license its symbols to only a few entities and to prohibit the symbols' use by such entities as the
SFAA.
291. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
Not surprisingly,2 92 Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from
the Court's state action ruling. Writing for himself and Justice Marshall,
Justice Brennan declared that the USOC's decision to prohibit SFAA's
use of "Olympics" was state action on two independent grounds. First,
he found that the USOC is a governmental actor because it performs
"important governmental functions."'2 93 Conceding that conduct is not a
state function just because it serves the public, Justice Brennan noted
that "[t]he Court has repeatedly held.., that 'when private individuals
or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmen-
tal in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and
subject to its constitutional limitations.' "294 Finding that a private en-
tity's actions constitute state action is even more "appropriate when the
function performed is 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative' of
government. '295
Justice Brennan found that the USOC performed several traditional
government functions that justify the Fifth Amendment's application to
the USOC's actions. The USOC represents the United States to the
world community. By statute, it is the exclusive coordinating body for
amateur athletic activity in the United States relating to international
amateur athletic competition.296 Pursuant to this statutory authority,
the USOC appoints particular organizations as the "national governing
body" for particular sports.2 97 The USOC also resolves disputes between
various amateur sports participants and organizations relating to interna-
tional competition.29 Based on these functions, Justice Brennan deter-
mined that "the USOC has been endowed by the Federal Government
with the exclusive power to serve a unique national, administrative, adju-
dicative, and representational role." '29 9
The second reason that Justices Brennan and Marshall found the
USOC's conduct to be state action was that the government was a joint
participant in the USOC's actions. Moreover, Justices O'Connor and
292. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from most of the Burger Court's refusals to
find state action. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830 (1982); Jackson, 419 U.S. 345; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1974).
But see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
293. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 549 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
295. Id. (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353).
296. 36 U.S.C. § 375(a)(1) (1988) (quoted in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at
554).
297. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 554 (citing 36 U.S.C. § 375(a)(4)).
298. Id. (citing 36 U.S.C. §§ 375(a)(5), 382(b)).
299. Id. at 555 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Blackmun joined the dissent on this point.3" The dissenters found that
the federal government and the USOC have the symbiotic relationship
that resulted in a finding of state action in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority.301 Through the Amateur Sports Act, Congress bestowed on
the USOC extensive power and financial resources, including exclusive
rights to the word "Olympics" and various Olympic symbols. Congress's
purpose in granting those rights to the USOC was to fund its activities.30 2
The USOC, meanwhile, gives Congress precisely what it sought: effec-
tive coordination and administration of American competition in inter-
national amateur athletics.30 3
B. NCAA v. Tarkanian 3 1
After conducting an investigation and a hearing, the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 305 found that the University of Ne-
vada, Las Vegas (UNLV), violated NCAA rules governing the
recruitment of student athletes. Many of the alleged violations impli-
cated UNLV's successful basketball coach, Jerry Tarkanian. The NCAA
proposed a series of sanctions including probation from participation in
postseason tournaments and televised games.30 6 In addition, the Com-
mittee requested that UNLV "show cause why additional penalties
should not be imposed if it failed to discipline Tarkanian by removing
him completely from the University's intercollegiate athletic program
during the [two year] probation period. 30 7 UNLV notified Tarkanian
that he would in fact be severed from its athletic program for two
300. Writing for herself and Justice Blackmun, Justice O'Connor stated: "Largely for the
reasons explained by Justice Brennan ... I believe the United States Olympic Committee and
the United States are joint participants in the challenged activity ...." Id. at 548 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
301. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). The Court ignored Burton except in the dissent. San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 556 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Burton is discussed supra notes
195-202 and accompanying text.
302. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 557.
303. Id. at 557-59.
304. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
305. The NCAA is an unincorporated association of nearly all private and public colleges
and universities in the United States that operate major athletic programs. Its policies are
determined at annual conventions, and it is governed by a Council. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at
183. The NCAA has a multitude of rules governing the eligibility, admission, financial aid,
and recruiting of student athletes by its member institutions. Its bylaws provide for a Commit-
tee on Infractions to enforce these rules.
306. Id. at 186.
307. Id.
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Tarkanian filed an action in Nevada state court seeking to enjoin his
suspension and alleging that UNLV's actions violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by depriving him of property and liberty without due pro-
cess of law.3a°  Following procedural fights and several appeals,
Tarkanian added the NCAA as a defendant, alleging that the NCAA's
actions also violated the Amendment. The Nevada Supreme Court held
that the NCAA and UNLV were state actors and that both violated due
process.310 The state supreme court affirmed the trial court's injunction
forbidding the NCAA or UNLV to enforce the sanctions against
Tarkanian and forbidding the NCAA to conduct any further proceedings
against UNLV. 31 1 The NCAA petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari, and the Court granted the petition.
By a five to four majority,312 the Supreme Court held that the
NCAA's conduct was not state action and that the NCAA did not act
under color of state law. The Court rejected Tarkanian's argument that
UNLV had delegated to the NCAA the state function of adopting rules
to govern UNLV's athletic program. The Court stated that UNLV, a
state university, "without question is a state actor. 3 1 3 The Court further
noted that UNLV's actions against Tarkanian were influenced by the
rules and findings of the NCAA.314 The Court ruled, however, that the
university's participation in the creation of the NCAA's rules and its
adoption of the NCAA's standards did not transform the NCAA's ac-
tions into state action. The Court found that the source of the rules was
the NCAA's "collective membership," which is composed of numerous
private institutions and public institutions in other states.31 5 Moreover,
the Court determined that UNLV retained authority not only to reject
the rules but also to avoid the suspension of Tarkanian316 UNLV's exer-
cise of that authority simply carried costs that UNLV preferred not to
308. Before removing Tarkanian, UNLV appealed the decision of the Committee on In-
fractions to the NCAA's governing Council, but the Council approved the Committee's rec-
ommendations. Id.
309. Id. at 187.
310. Id. at 189-90.
311. Id. at 188-89.
312. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice
Stevens's opinion for the Court.
313. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192.
314. Id. at 193.
315. Id.
316. Indeed, after conducting his own hearing to determine whether the university should
apply the NCAA's proposed sanctions, the university's vice-president advised the president
that the university had three options:
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bear: additional NCAA sanctions.317  The Court thus held that
"[n]either UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's standards nor its mi-
nor role in their formulation is a sufficient reason for concluding that the
NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law when it promulgated stan-
dards governing athlete recruitment, eligibility, and academic
performance. 31
8
The Court also rejected Tarkanian's argument that the NCAA's en-
forcement proceedings and sanctions resulted from a delegation of state
power by UNLV. The Court recognized that "a state may delegate au-
thority to a private party and thereby make that party a state actor. '319
The Court found that UNLV gave no power to the NCAA and that the
NCAA imposed sanctions only on UNLV, not Tarkanian. 320 Moreover,
the NCAA's sanctions and possible sanctions against UNLV involved
only UNLV's continued participation in NCAA competition.3 21 The
NCAA could not mandate UNLV to take any action against Tarkanian,
and it could do nothing to Tarkanian directly.322 UNLV retained full
authority to act as it deemed appropriate toward Tarkanian. UNLV sim-
ply chose to abide by the sanctions rather than risk further sanctions.
The NCAA thus was not a state actor.
The Court also rejected Tarkanian's contention that the UNLV and
the NCAA were joint participants in the challenged act. 323 The Court
pointed out that UNLV and the NCAA actually were adversaries
throughout the proceedings. Because their interests did not coincide, the
Court held that the relationship did not meet the requirements estab-
lished in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority324 for the symbiosis or
joint participation theory of state action.325
"1. Reject the sanction requiring us [UNLV] to disassociate Coach Tarkanian from
the athletic program and take the risk of still heavier sanctions, eg., possible extra
years of probation.
"2. Recognize the University's delegation to the NCAA of the power to act as ulti-
mate arbiter of these matters, thus reassigning Mr. Tarkanian from his present posi-
tion-though tenured and without adequate notice-even while believing that the
NCAA is wrong.
"3. Pull out of the NCAA completely on the grounds that you will not execute what
you hold to be their unjust judgments."
Id. at 187 (quoting the appendix to the appellate briefs).
317. Id. at 198.
318. Id. at 195.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 195-97.
321. Id. at 187, 198; see supra note 316.
322. Id. at 198 n.18.
323. Id. at 196-97 n.16.
324. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
325. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196-97 n.16.
The four dissenting Justices326 would have held the NCAA to be a
state actor. Writing for Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, Jus-
tice White argued that the NCAA was a state actor because it "acted
jointly with UNLV in suspending Tarkanian. ' '327 He noted that the sus-
pension resulted from violations of NCAA rules that UNLV embraced in
its agreement with the NCAA. UNLV also agreed that the NCAA
would conduct hearings concerning any violations of the rules and the
NCAA in fact conducted the hearings that led to Tarkanian's proposed
suspension. UNLV also agreed with the NCAA that the NCAA's find-
ings would be binding.
In short, it was the NCAA's findings that Tarkanian had violated
NCAA rules, made at NCAA-conducted hearings, all of which
were agreed to by UNLV in its membership agreement with the
NCAA, that resulted in Tarkanian's suspension by UNLV. On
these facts, the NCAA was "jointly engaged with [UNLV] officials
in the challenged action."32 .
The dissent thus would have ruled the NCAA to be a state actor subject
to the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope329
The defendant, Joanne Pope, was the executrix of her husband's es-
tate. The plaintiff, Tulsa Professional Collection Services, filed proceed-
ings against her seeking payment for medical care received by her
husband during his long stay at the hospital prior to his death. Pope
raised Oklahoma's "nonclaim statute" as a defense. That statute requires
"claims 'arising upon a contract' . .. to be presented to the executor or
executrix of the estate within 2 months of the publication of a notice
advising creditors of the commencement of probate proceedings. '330
Tulsa Professional conceded that it did not present its claim within two
months of the executrix's publication, but it contended that the provision
of notice to creditors by publication alone deprived it of property without
due process of law.331 After the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected this
326. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, dissenting in Tarkanian, also joined the
dissent in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522
(1987), in which Justice Blackmun was the fourth dissenter. In Tarkanian, Justice White was
the fourth dissenter and wrote the dissenting opinion.
327. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 200.
328. Id. at 202 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28
(1980)).
329. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
330, Id. at 479 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 333 (1981)).
331. Id. at 479, 483.
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contention, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider the question.
A nearly unanimous Court332 held that the probate court's involve-
ment made that court responsible for Tulsa Professional's loss and that
due process required personal notice by mail. The Court first determined
that neither the private use of "state sanctioned private remedies" nor
"the mere running of a general statute of limitation" is state action that
implicates due process.333 Yet because of the probate court's "involve-
ment with the nonclaim statute," the Court held that the Due Process
Clause was implicated.
The probate court is intimately involved throughout, and without
that involvement the time bar is never activated. The nonclaim
statute becomes operative only after probate proceedings have been
commenced in state court. The court must appoint the executor or
executrix before notice, which triggers the time bar, can be given.
Only after this court appointment is inade does the statute provide
for any notice; § 331 directs the executor or executrix to publish
notice "immediately" after appointment.... Finally, copies of the
notice and an affidavit of publication must be filed with the court.
§ 332. It is only after all of these actions take place that the time
period begins to run, and in every one of these actions, the court is
intimately involved. This involvement is so pervasive and substan-
tial that it must be considered state action subject to the restric-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3 34
The Court held that "by virtue of the [nonclaim] statute, the probate
proceedings themselves" deprived Tulsa Professional of its property.335
The Court then applied the balancing test of Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank and Trust Co.336 to hold that due process requires that creditors
receive individual notice by mail.337
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. He concluded that the statute
operated like a "self-executing" statute of limitation and thus was en-
tirely consistent with the Due Process Clause.338 The fact that probate
332. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result without a separate opinion, and Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist was the lone dissent. For a discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion, see infra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
333. Pope, 485 U.S. at 485 (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) and Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)).
334. Id. at 487.
335. Id. at 488.
336. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
337. Pope, 485 U.S. at 490.
338. Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982), in which
"the Court upheld against challenge under the Due Process Clause an Indiana statute provid-
ing that severed mineral interests which had not been used for a period of 20 years lapsed and
reverted to the surface owner unless the mineral owner filed a statement of claim in the appro-
court proceedings had to be implemented before an executor could be
appointed and notice published did not, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion, implicate the probate court in the "deprivation." '339 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist held that the nonclaim statute's operation, which by itself
was entirely constitutional under Short, "deprived" the creditor of his
cause of action-not the probate court.340 Because the probate court did
not deprive the plaintiff creditor of its cause of action, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded, the Due Process Clause did not require the credi-
tor to receive personal notice of the probate court's proceedings. 341
D. Summary
The Court's decisions in these three cases do not alter significantly
the existing state action theories.342 The Court's opinions and the dis-
senting opinions apply the theories as articulated in earlier cases and find
them applicable or inapplicable based on the facts of each case. These
cases are important nonetheless because they reflect shifts in various Jus-
tices' acceptance of certain state action theories and the liberality with
which they apply the theories. Part IV analyzes this development.343
IV. State Action Models of the Rehnquist Court
Despite the emergence of a conservative "working majority" on
most issues, 3 " the three state action cases of the Rehnquist Court dis-
priate county office." Pope, 485 U.S. at 492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's view that statutes of limitation and nonclaim statutes satisfy due process whenever they
are self-executing is consistent with his theory of state inaction. A statute of limitation's or
nonclaim statute's self-executing nature limits the circumstances in which the state will inter-
vene to assist a creditor in obtaining a debt from a debtor or debtor's estate. Such non-discre-
tionary statutes limit the availability of state assistance to a specific time period. Lessees, for
example, can invoke state power to protect their possession of property only for a certain
period of time (the term of their leases). By enacting the statute and thereby limiting the
circumstances under which the state will intervene, the state merely defines the extent of the
creditor's property interest. The creditor's property, his cause of action, is simply smaller than
it would be if the state defined it differently. Cf supra notes 131-52 and accompanying text
(discussing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)).
339. Pope, 485 U.S. at 493-94 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. The Court's statement in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987), that state action exists only if the government coerces or signifi-
cantly encourages the challenged decision, iad at 546, would alter existing state action theories
if broadly applied. See supra note 287. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court, however, did
not address the scope of this requirement which was adopted from the Court's decision in
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). See supra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
343. Specifically, see infra notes 426-34, 437-61 and accompanying text.
344. See Howard, supra note 4, at 69.
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cussed in Part III reveal that a wide range of views on the state action
doctrine persist on the Court. The extreme views of the state action doc-
trine that were present on the Burger Court continue to be represented.
Chief Justice Rehnquist continues to apply a strict vision of the state
action doctrine, seldom finding state action under any theory.345 Justice
Marshall, and until recently, Justice Brennan, continues to apply an ex-
pansive vision of the state action doctrine to find state action under a
variety of theories in nearly every case before the Court.346
The Rehnquist Court cases reveal, however, an emerging modifica-
tion of the state action doctrine that lies between these extremes. In ad-
dition to Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Marshall's well developed
views on the state action doctrine, the opinions and votes in the Court's
state action cases reveal a third distinct model of the state action doc-
trine. I have labeled these three models according to their adherents: the
Rehnquist model, the Marshall/Brennan model, and the O'Connor
model.347 Although each of these models accepts the state action theo-
ries and the structure of the state action doctrine described in Part II,
they differ in how stringently they apply various state action theories.348
A. The Rehnquist Model
The Rehnquist model of the state action doctrine is the most restric-
tive of the three. For the most part, it is the prevailing doctrine embod-
ied in the Court's majority opinions. 349 Chief Justice Rehnquist after all
was the architect of the Burger Court's contraction of the state action
350doctrine, writing most of the Burger Court's key state action opinions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist discusses and purports to accept all of the state
action theories described earlier.351 Yet he almost never applies them to
345. See supra notes 277-91, 312-25, 338-41 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 292-303, 326-28 and accompanying text.
347. The choice of a label for the "O'Connor Model" is explained in note 427 infra.
348. Because some Justices have written more state action opinions and participated in
more state action decisions than others, the picture of some models is more complete than
others.
349. Ironically, the Burger Court's state action decisions embrace the Rehnquist model
most clearly. The Rehnquist model currently prevails because doctrinal changes reflected in
recent Rehnquist Court cases are only beginning to emerge.
350. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1922), Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). He also
wrote a dissenting opinion in Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478
(1988). Indeed, because Chief Justice Rehnquist has authored so many of the Court's state
action opinions, the picture of the Rehnquist model of the state action doctrine is the most
clear and complete.
351. See supra text accompanying note 45.
find state action to exist. He generally distinguishes earlier cases that
apply particular state action theories and thus finds the theories inappli-
cable to the cases before him. His opinions construct a restrictive model
of the state action doctrine that seldom treats private conduct as state
action.
1. Settled Concepts of State Action
Several aspects of the state action doctrine are so well settled that all
members of the Court accept them, including adherents of the restrictive
Rehnquist model. First, all of the Justices would find the overt conduct
of state officials carrying out official state policy to be state action. Such
official activity is the paramount example of pure state action, which
must be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment to give the Amendment
any practical meaning." 2 Second, all the Justices adhere to the long-
standing rule that the conduct of a state official who abuses his authority
to act contrary to official state policy is nonetheless state action. 53 Fi-
nally, the entire Court deems the judicial application of substantive law
to grant civil judicial remedies 354 to be state action subject to the Four-
teenth Amendment. 55
2. State Inaction as State Action
Perhaps the most controversial substantive aspect of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's model of state action 35 6 for commentators is his conviction
that pure, consistent state inaction is not state action, or at least is not
state action that violates due process and equal protection restraints. 357
352. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880); see also supra note 46 and accompa-
nying text.
353. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 60-100 and accompanying text.
355. See id. But cf Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978) (Chief Justice
Rehnquist suggests that a specific rule of law, standing alone, is not state action that violates
the Due Process Clause). There is dubious viability of the proposition perhaps applied in
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), that state enforcement of a private legal right makes the
private action underlying that right state action. For the reasons discussed supra notes 87-97,
this proposition is fraught with problems and has been the subject of many attacks. See, eg.,
G. GUNTHER, supra note 78, at 1002; McCoy, supra note 72, at 793; Wechsler, supra note 86,
at 29-31. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, relied on this proposi-
tion to enjoin state enforcement of a regulation in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972), that required licensees to abide by their by-laws.
356. Other aspects of the Rehnquist model are controversial, but the controversy lies less in
Chief Justice Rehnquist's substantive interpretation of state action doctrine than in his strict
application of the doctrine.
357. Some of Chief Justice Rehnquist's statements suggest that the mere formulation of
state law-especially laws by which the government expresses its intent not to intervene in
specified private activity-is not, without more, state action. The better interpretation, how-
St~ing 19911 STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Pure state inaction is the state's decision not to intervene in certain types
of private conduct or privately inflicted harm.358 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion in Flagg Bros. held that such a decision by the state does
not "authorize or encourage" the challenged private activity so as to
make the private conduct attributable to the state.359 This holding im-
plies that the state's decision not to intervene in a private dispute, while
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, cannot violate it.361 Under the
Rehnquist model, then, the state may constitutionally leave private enti-
ties in a state of nature with respect to any private behavior even if that
behavior harms people in some way. 61
3. The Government Function Theory, the Conduct of Regulated Entities,
and the Joint Participation Theory
The Rehnquist model receives its most heated attacks on the Court
for its application of the government function, regulated entities, and
joint participation theories of state action. Chief Justice Rehnquist pur-
ports to accept these theories, but he has never used them to find state
action.362 Moreover, his opinions for the Court have added requirements
for the application of these theories, making them more restrictive.363
Vigorous dissents attack Chief Justice Rehnquist's formulation of the
theories and his application of them as formulated.
Several of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions expressly state that
government regulation of private activity under some circumstances can
result in the private activity's being deemed state action.3 4 He has sug-
gested that state action exists if the state coerces or substantially encour-
ages the private conduct. 365 His application of this approach, however,
indicates that nothing short of actual state compulsion of the challenged
ever, is that such statements of law are state action but are unlikely to violate the Due Process
Clause because no property or liberty is taken. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to use
the phrase "state action" to refer not simply to government conduct (to which the Fourteenth
Amendment surely applies) but to government conduct that deprives someone of property or
liberty, thus creating the issue of whether the deprivation takes place without due process of
law. See supra note 151.
358. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
359. Flagg Bros, 436 U.S. at 164-65; see supra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
361. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); see
supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g., Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions for the Court in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1982); Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. 149; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974); see also supra notes 156-62, 164, 174-85, 244-61.
363. See supra notes 244-61 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 175.
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act will result in the private conduct's being deemed state action.366
Chief Justice Rehnquist also purports to accept the symbiosis or
joint participation theory of state action, 367 but he applies such a strict
version of the theory that it lacks meaning. Most of Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's state action opinions discuss Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority,368 some at length, but they always distinguish Burton rather than
follow it.369 Chief Justice Rehnquist also applies the theory differently
from the way it was conceived. Rather than evaluating the cumulative
impact of all the ties between the state and the private actor who per-
formed the challenged conduct,370 Chief Justice Rehnquist considers the
various ties separately, finding each insufficient to warrant a finding of
state action.371 Chief Justice Rehnquist's refusal to find state action on
the basis of the joint participation theory in several cases, most notably
Blum v. Yaretsky, 372 casts doubt over his acceptance of the joint partici-
pation theory. 73
Chief Justice Rehnquist recognizes the government function theory
of state action, but he interprets and applies that theory very strictly as
well a.37  He discusses Marsh v. Alabama3 75 and the White Primary
Cases376 approvingly in several opinions,3 77 and he has never suggested
that the government function theory is not viable in some form. Yet his
opinions emphasize the exclusivity requirement of the government func-
tion theory378 and apply an increasingly restrictive version of that re-
quirement.379 Consequently, Chief Justice Rehnquist has never found
366. See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)).
367. See supra note 192.
368. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
369. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010-11; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
357-58 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172-74 (1972).
370. See Burton, 365 U.S. 715.
371. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 1160.
372. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
373. See supra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
374. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist discusses the government function the-
ory but finds it inapplicable in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), and Blum, 457 U.S. 991. For a discussion of the treat-
ment of the government function theories in Jackson and Flagg Brol, see supra notes 244-61
and accompanying text.
375. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
376. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
377. See Flagg Bros, 436 U.S. at 158-64.
378. See supra notes 246-61 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 258.
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the theory applicable to any case that he has decided.38°
Blum demonstrates the restrictiveness of these three theories of state
action under the Rehnquist model. The activities of the nursing homes
in Blum and their ties to the state produce sound arguments for a finding
of state action under each of these theories. Writing for the Court, how-
ever, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected each theory with a minimum of
discussion and analysis."8'
B. The Marshall Model3" 2
The Marshall model of the state action doctrine applies the Four-
teenth Amendment to private conduct more freely than either of the
other two models. It embraces the settled concepts of state action,38 3 and
it would deem a wide array of ostensibly private conduct to be state ac-
tion with a minimum level of state involvement.3" 4 Justice Marshall
would accept all the state action theories,3 5 and would formulate and
apply them liberally to find state action.3 86
380. See supra notes 244-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's opinions in
Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. 149, and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), both
of which were written by Chief Justice Rehnquist).
381. For a discussion of the argument supporting a finding of state action under the "regu-
lated entity" theory and Chief Justi~e Rehnquist's treatment of that argument, see supra notes
177-85 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the argument supporting the application of
the joint participation theory and Chief Justice Rehnquist's rejection of that argument, see
supra notes 205-15 and accompanying text. The nursing homes' transfer decisions in Blum
also served a government function. The sole purpose of the transfers was to serve the state
function of controlling the cost of the Medicaid program to the state. See supra notes 181-83,
210-11 and accompanying text. The transfers also had the practical effect of determining the
level of public assistance a citizen received under the program. Chief Justice Rehnquist none-
theless concluded that the government function theory did not apply to the nursing homes'
actions. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011-12 (1982).
382. This model could just as appropriately be labelled the Brennan model or the Marshall-
Brennan model: Justices Marshall and Brennan voted together on most of the state action
decisions in which they both participated. See, eg., San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United
States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972). Moreover, Justice Brennan was part of the Warren Court majority in such cases as
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), which formulated the broader state
action theories. I labelled this model the "Marshall Model" only because of Justice Brennan's
recent resignation from the Court.
383. See supra notes 352-55 and accompanying text.
384. Indeed, Justices Marshall and Brennan both would have found state action in every
major state action case before the Court during their tenure, except Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312 (1981). See, eg., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42 (1988).
385. See infra notes 387-424 and accompanying text.
386. Id.
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1. State Inaction
Justice Marshall has not addressed significantly the theory that state
inaction with respect to a private dispute is state action.387 Justice Mar-
shall concurred in Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Flagg Bros. 388 in
which Justice Stevens held that the state's acquiescence in Flagg Broth-
ers' sale made the sale state action.389 Justice Marshall thus apparently
agrees with the acquiescence-inaction theory and its ramifications. Jus-
tice Stevens's opinion also relied on the government function theory,
however, and Justice Marshall may have based his position more on that
theory than the acquiescence-inaction theory. Indeed, Justice Marshall
wrote his own brief dissenting opinion in Flagg Bros. in which he at-
tacked the majority's formulation and application of the government
function theory.390 Justice Marshall's view of the acquiescence-inaction
theory of state action is thus ambiguous. Although he probably agrees
with the concept of acquiescence-inaction, he seldom uses or addresses
this theory because he would find state action relying upon other state
action theories.391
2. The Government Function Theory
Justice Marshall would formulate the government function theory
much more broadly than the Court, including Chief Justice Rehnquist,
has done. He would not require that a function be "traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of government" in order for the government func-
tion theory to apply.392 He concedes that "a finding of government ac-
tion is particularly appropriate when the function performed is
'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of government,' "but he contends
that the Court has never limited the application of the government func-
tion theory to such circumstances. 93 Justice Marshall would find that a
private entity performs a government function when "the activity in
question is of such public importance" that governments invariably per-
form the activity themselves or permit private entities to perform it sub-
ject to extensive regulation.394 Justice Marshall also would hold private
387. But see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
388. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 168 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
389. Id. at 166.
390. 436 U.S. at 166-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
391. Compare Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Flagg Bros. to Justice Stevens'.
392. San Francisco Art & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic C6mm., 483 U.S. 522,
549-50 n. 1 (1987) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
393. Id. at 549 & n.1 (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
394. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 371-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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entities to be performing a government function when they "are endowed
by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature." '395
Justice Marshall's application of the government function theory in
Jackson and San Francisco Arts & Athletics demonstrates his more liberal
conception of the theory. In Jackson, Justice Marshall conceded that an
enterprise is not state action just because it is "affected with the public
interest." '396 He also conceded that the provision of electric utility ser-
vice is not traditionally performed exclusively by government. He stated,
however, that governments traditionally have found utility service to be
so important that they "invariably" subject private companies providing
such service to pervasive regulation if the states do not provide the ser-
vice themselves.397 "In my view," he wrote,
utility service is traditionally identified with the State through uni-
versal public regulation or ownership to a degree sufficient to
render it a "public function.". . . [When the activity in question
is of such public importance that the State invariably either pro-
vides the service itself or permits private companies to act as state
surrogates in providing it, much more is involved than just a mat-
ter of public interest. In those cases, the State has determined that
if private companies wish to enter the field, they will have to sur-
render many of the prerogatives normally associated with private
enterprise and behave in many ways like a government body. And
when the State's regulatory scheme has gone that far, it seems en-
tirely consistent to impose on the public utility the constitutional
burdens normally reserved for the State.3 98
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Justices Marshall and Brennan
perceived the USOC to be performing several government functions pur-
suant to specific grants of authority from Congress. Congress designated
the USOC as the United States' "exclusive representative" to the Inter-
national Olympic Committee, hence making it exclusively responsible for
the United States representation at the Olympic Games.39 9 Justice Bren-
395. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 548-49 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
396. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 372 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
397. Id.
398. Id. at 371-72.
399. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 550 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan recognized that Congress empowered the USOC "to represent
the United States as its national Olympic committee," 36 U.S.C. § 375 (1982), and that the
rules of the International Olympic Committee provide that National Olympic Committees
shall be "'the sole authorities responsible for the representation of their respective countries at
the Olympic Games.'" San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 550 n.2, (quoting Interna-
tional Olympic Committee Rule 24(B) (emphasis added by Justice Brennan)). Justice Brennan
also argued at some length that "Olympic participation is inescapably nationalist [and polit-
ical]." Id. at 550-55.
nan contended that such exclusive international representation in an "in-
escapably nationalist" forum is a role traditionally reserved to the
government.' ° ° Congress also bestowed on the USOC, he notes, "un-
precedented administrative authority over American athletic organiza-
tions relating to international competition."4 "1 The USOC became the
"coordinating bod[y]" for American international competition in ama-
teur sports,4"2 with the authority to designate organizations as the "na-
tional governing body" for particular sports4"3 and to resolve disputes
between private amateur sports organizations.' Because "the USOC
[was] endowed by the Federal Government with the exclusive power to
serve a unique national, administrative, adjudicative, and representa-
tional role," Justice Brennan reasoned that the USOC was analogous to
the company town in Marsh v. Alabama40 5 and the private political par-
ties in Terry v. Adams.4"6 "Like those entities," he concluded, "the
USOC is a private organization on whom the Government has bestowed
inherently public powers and responsibilities. Its actions, like theirs,
ought to be subject to constitutional limits.""4 7
In addition, once the Marshall model finds a private entity's activi-
ties to be a government function, it applies constitutional restrictions to a
broader range of the private entity's activities than the Rehnquist model
does. Upon finding that a private entity is engaged in a government func-
tion, Justice Marshall would subject all of the entity's actions to constitu-
tional restraints-not just those that are a government function.
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Justices Marshall and Brennan
found a wide range of the USOC's activities to be government functions,
but they did not discuss whether the challenged conduct-licensing the
use of the word "Olympic"-was a government function. Licensing the
use of words is not a traditionally government function, because private
enterprises that own trademark and similar rights historically make the
decision whether and when to license the marks' use to others purely as a
private business decision.4"8 Yet Justices Brennan and Marshall would
apply fourteenth amendment restrictions to the USOC's decision not to
permit SFAA's use of its Olympic symbols based on the USOC's other
400. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 550.
401. Id. at 553.
402. 36 U.S.C. § 375(a)(1) (1982).
403. Id. § 375(a)(4).
404. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see 36 U.S.C. § 375(a)(5), 382(b).
405. 326 U.S, 501 (1946).
406. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
407. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 555-56.
408. See id. at 547.
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activities and powers.' When a litigant challenges the constitutionality
of a private entity's actions, therefore, Justices Brennan and Marshall
would subject the conduct to constitutional scrutiny if the entity per-
forms a government function. It would be irrelevant that the challenged
conduct was not a government function and did not take place in per-
forming the government function. 1 °
3. Governmentally Regulated Conduct
Justice Marshall would have treated the conduct of state-regulated
entities as state action in several cases.411 Although the role that the
state regulation played in his analysis varies, his conclusions clearly are
based in part on the existence and content of the state regulations.412 He
certainly would agree with Chief Justice Rehnquist's view that private
conduct compelled by state regulation is state action subject to constitu-
tional restraints.413 He also would agree that private conduct is subject
to the Fourteenth Amendment when the state significantly encourages
the conduct.414 Justice Marshall is more willing, however, to find that
state regulations provide the involvement or encouragement to the chal-
409. See id. at 550-54 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (discusses the
USOC's role as international representative of the United States, coordinator of American
amateur athletics and adjudicator of disputes among amateur athletics organizations).
410. This position reflects a more general disagreement with the Rehnquist model. Under-
lying, but not clearly articulated in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions, is the requirement that
a "nexus ... exist between the plaintiff's state action theory and the challenged activity."
McCoy, supra note 72, at 818 (exploring the meaning, theoretical foundation, and scope of the
"nexus" requirement imposed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)). Thus, if the plaintiff seeks to have the defendant treated as the state
on the basis of the state's regulation of the defendant, as the Jackson plaintiff did, then Chief
Justice Rehnquist would require "state regulatory involvement in the challenged activity."
McCoy, supra note 72, at 818; see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351. If the plaintiff seeks to use the
government function theory, she must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was part of the
government function. McCoy, supra note 72, at 819-21.
411. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Jackson, 419 U.S. 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
412. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Blum, 457 U.S. at
1019-27 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 368-70 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 184-89.
413. See Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 189 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dis-
senting); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 368-70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
414. Indeed, Justice Brennan wrote in Moose Lodge No. 107 that the "'existence of efforts
by the State, through legislation or otherwise, to authorize, encourage, or otherwise support
racial discrimination in a particular facet of life constitutes illegal state involvement in those
pertinent private acts of discrimination that subsequently occur.'" Moose Lodge No. 107, 407
U.S. at 190 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 202 (1970) (separate opinion of Brennan, J.)).
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lenged private conduct necessary to deem the activities of the regulated
private entity to be state action.415 Indeed, Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in Moose Lodge No. 107, which Justice Marshall joined, suggests
that pervasive, detailed state regulation alone may justify applying con-
stitutional restraints to a regulated private entity's actions.416 Justices
Brennan's and Marshall's discussion of state regulatory involvement in
private activity, however, generally overlaps or is part of their applica-
tion of other state action theories, particularly the joint participation
theory.417
4. The Joint Participation-Symbiosis Theory
Unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Marshall freely and liberally
applies the joint participation-symbiosis theory developed in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority."'8 This formulation of the theory's stan-
dard is no different from that of Chief Justice Rehnquist's. He asks
whether the "Government 'has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a
joint participant in the challenged activity.' "419 Justice Marshall's appli-
cation of the theory, however, differs radically from Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's, as his differing results attest. Unlike the Rehnquist model, the
Marshall model more readily considers the cumulative impact of all the
ties between the state and the private entity rather than considering each
fact individually.420 The Marshall model also considers factors that re-
late to other state action theories and the applicability of other theories in
415. See Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 190 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
416. See generally id. at 184-90 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). Quoting
the District Court, Justice Brennan stated: "'We believe the decisive factor is the uniqueness
and the all-pervasiveness of the regulation by the Commonwealth.'" Id. at 186 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). "'It would be difficult.., to consider the state neutral in an area which is so
permeated with state regulation and control.'" Id at 189.
417. See, eg., Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 184-85 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall,
J., dissenting); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also relied
on the state's regulatory involvement in Jackson to conclude that utilities are subject to four-
teenth amendment restraints under the government function theory. Id. at 372.
418. Compare Justice White's opinion in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199-203
(1988), which Justice Marshall joined, with the Court's opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined.
419. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
556 (1987) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
420. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 1164-65; cf Jackson, 419 U.S. at 360, 362-63 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
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assessing the state's relationship to the private entity.421 Applying the
theory in this fashion, Justice Marshall would have held the challenged
conduct to be state action in nearly every state action decision in which
he participated.422
Justice Marshall's version of the joint participation theory also dif-
fers from Chief Justice Rehnquist's in that he asks only whether the state
has insinuated itself into the private entity's operations-not whether it
was directly involved in the challenged conduct. He concedes that the
state's involvement directly in the challenged conduct may be a relevant
inquiry when the state's involvement is limited.4 2 3 "But where the State
has so thoroughly insinuated itself into the operations of the enterprise
[as it did in Jackson] it should not be fatal if the State has not affirma-
tively sanctioned the particular practice in question."'4 2 4
C. The O'Connor Model
The O'Connor model is the newest of the three state action models
discussed in this Article. Opinions from the early 1970s and before re-
flect both the Rehnquist and Marshall models,42 5 but the O'Connor
model emerged only in the recent state action cases of the Rehnquist
Court.426 The O'Connor model is a hybrid middle position between the
Rehnquist model and the Marshall model. While it more readily finds
private conduct to be state action than does the Rehnquist model, it does
not embrace all of the state action theories as freely and liberally as the
Marshall model.
4 2 7
421. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1027-28 (1982) (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., dissenting).
422. See, e.g., Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199-203 (White, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485-88 (1988);
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 446-59 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1027-28 (1982) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 847-48 (1982) (Marshall, J., joined by Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 366-71 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 184-90 (1972) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
423. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 369-70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
424. Id. at 370 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
425. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court and Justice Marshall's dissent in Jack-
son demonstrate clearly the Rehnquist and Marshall models.
426. See Pope, 485 U.S. 478; Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (White, J., joined by O'Connor, J.,
and others, dissenting); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. 522 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
427. Labelling this new middle approach the "O'Connor model" is perhaps imprecise but
no less precise than other labels. Justice O'Connor apparently embraced the Rehnquist model
early in her tenure on the Court. She joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), and she joined then-Chief Justice Burger's opinion for
the Court in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). Nonetheless, she appears to be
playing a central role in the Court's current shift away from complete acceptance of the Rehn-
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The O'Connor model follows the Rehnquist model's formulation
and application of every state action theory except the joint participa-
tion-symbiosis theory. Like Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor
has never found state action based on the government function theory.42 8
In fact, while she and Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Brennan's
conclusion in San Francisco Arts & Athletics that the USOC was subject
to the Fourteenth Amendment under the joint participation theory, they
both expressly refused to join the part of Justice Brennan's opinion that
found the USOC to be performing a government function.42 9 Justice
O'Connor also apparently agrees with Chief Justice Rehnquist's treat-
ment of regulated entities.43 ° Finally, Justice O'Connor has never con-
fronted the state inaction issue such as the one in Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks.431 Her views on that state action theory, therefore, are
unknown.432
Justice O'Connor departs from the Rehnquist model in her applica-
tion of the joint participation theory. Although she joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist and then-Chief Justice Burger in refusing to apply the theory
in Blum and Rendell-Baker, she would have used it to find state action in
San Francisco Arts & Athletics and Tarkanian.3 3 The dissenting opin-
ions in these cases reflect differences between the Rehnquist model's joint
participation theory and the O'Connor model's joint participation the-
ory. Like Justices Marshall and Brennan, Justice O'Connor considers
quist model. Several Justices have participated in this trend: Justice White wrote the dissent-
ing opinion for four Justices who would have found state action in Tarkanian; Justice
Blackmun would have found state action in San Francisco Arts & Athletics along with three
other Justices; and only Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's finding of state
action in Pope. Justices O'Connor, Marshall, and Brennan were the only members of the
Court who would have found state action in all three cases. Moreover, Justice O'Connor
wrote the opinion of the Court in Pope and a brief dissent in San Francisco Arts & Athletics.
428. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179; Pope, 485 U.S. 478; Blum, 457 U.S. 991; Rendell-Baker,
457 U.S. 830.
429. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
430. Justice O'Connor joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Blum in
which the Court indicated that state-regulated private conduct is state action on the basis of
the regulations only if the state compels or significantly encourages the private conduct. Blum,
457 U.S. at 1004. For additional discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's and the Court's treat-
ment of the regulated-conduct-as-state-action theory, see supra notes 364-66, 155-85 and ac-
companying text, respectively. In light of Justice O'Connor's (and Justices Blackmun's and
White's) increased willingness to find state action under the joint participation theory, she (and
Justices Blackmun and White) may give some weight to the existence of a pervasive regulatory
scheme in applying that theory.
431. 436 U.S. 149 (1978); see supra notes 95-140.
432. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc.
v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), may reflect some departure from the Rehnquist model's treat-
ment of state inaction, but any such departure was not explicit.
433. 483 U.S. at 548 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the cumulative relationship between the state and the private entity to
determine if the state is a joint participant. She does not focus on
whether the state was involved directly in the challenged decision. As
the Court noted in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, for example, the fed-
eral government exerted no influence over and was not involved in the
USOC's decision not to permit the SFAA's use of the word "Olympic"
and other Olympic symbols. Because of other ties and the mutual bene-
fits that flowed from the federal government's relationship to the USOC,
Justice O'Connor and the other dissenters nonetheless would have found
the state to be a joint participant in that decision.434
The O'Connor model, therefore, coincides to a great extent with the
Rehnquist model, but broadens it by applying a more liberal version of
the joint participation theory. Indeed, the O'Connor model applies the
theory largely as it was articulated in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority.35 The Burton Court did not require direct state involvement in
the restaurant's decision not to serve blacks and the Court evaluated the
cumulative effect of all the restaurant's ties with the state.436 The
O'Connor model reflects an effort to apply the Fourteenth Amendment
to more private activity with less direct state involvement than the Rehn-
quist model affords without going as far as the Marshall model.
D. Interaction of the State Action Models in the Rehnquist Court's
State Action Decisions
The Rehmquist model of state action commanded a solid majority
the Burger Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a majority of no less
than six justices in Blum v. Yaretsky,4 37 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.,438 and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,4 39 and then-Chief Justice Bur-
ger wrote for the same six in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.' 4 Except for Jus-
434. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For addi-
tional discussion of the dissenters' application of a broader joint participation theory in San
Francisco Arts & Athletics and Tarkanian, see supra notes 300-03, 326-28, and accompanying
text. Justice O'Connor also applied a broad joint participation theory in her opinion for the
Court in Pope. See supra notes 332-37 and accompanying text.
435. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
436. Id. at 724. For a discussion of Burton, see supra notes 195-202 and accompanying
text.
437. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
438. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
439. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
440. 457 U.S. 830 (1982). Joining Chief Justice Rehnquist and then-Chief Justice Burger
in these opinions were Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Burger, and Powell. Justice O'Connor
joined the opinions in Blum and Rendell-Baker, replacing retiring Justice Stewart who joined
the opinions in Jackson and Moose Lodge No. 107. Moreover, the Court's judgment in Blum
656
tice Douglas,"' Justices Marshall and Brennan were the only Justices to
dissent in Blum, Rendell-Baker, Jackson, and Moose Lodge No. 107. The
Burger Court's near-complete adherence to the Rehnquist model is most
evident in Blum. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a solid majority,
refused to find state action despite sound arguments under several theo-
ries that state action existed.442
One would have expected the Rehnquist Court to continue applying
a restrictive state action doctrine or to restrict it further. Although three
of the Rehnquist model's most loyal adherents, then-Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell and Stewart, are no longer on the Court, their
replacements are all Reagan appointees." 3  President Reagan took im-
mense care to find politically conservative, non-judicially-activist selec-
tions.4' The Rehnquist model, therefore, could have continued to
command a majority of seven Justices, leaving Justices Brennan and
Marshall as lone dissenters as they were in Blum and Rendell-Baker.
Despite the addition of the Reagan appointees, or perhaps because
of them, the Rehnquist Court's recent state action cases demonstrate an
erosion in the Rehnquist model's dominance." 5 Although the Marshall
model still commands the vote of only Justice Marshall," 6 the O'Connor
model has attracted the votes of at least two and as many as eight Jus-
tices." 7 The Justices' increased acceptance of the O'Connor model re-
flects the Court's movement toward a less restrictive state action
doctrine.
and Rendell-Baker carried a majority of seven Justices when Justice White concurred in the
judgment but not the Court's opinion.
441. Justice Douglas, who left the Court in 1975, dissented in Jackson and Moose Lodge
No. 107.
442. See supra note 381 and accompanying text. The only break in the Rehnquist model's
solid dominance came in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), when Justices Stevens
and White dissented, leaving a majority of only five, and Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982). Flagg Bros. concerned the difficult problem of the state refusing to act. See supra
notes 131-51 and accompanying text. Lugar concerned the issue of whether a litigant using
state attachment procedures acts under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1981); it did not actually concern the issue of whether the plaintiff's deprivation re-
sulted from state action.
443. President Reagan appointed Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
444. See, Davis, Power on the Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist's Opinion Assignments, 74
JUDICATURE 66, 66-67 (1990).
445. See infra notes 448-61 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 382, 440-42 and accompanying text.
447. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522 (1987), Justices O'Connor and Blackmun joined the portion of Justice Brennan's opinion
that found state action on the basis of the joint participation theory. The decisions of Justices
White, O'Connor, Brennan, and Marshall in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), also fit
the O'Connor model. Justice O'Connor wrote for all the Justices except Chief Justice Rehn-
quist in Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
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Although a majority of the Court declined to find state action in San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee" 8
and NCAA v. Tarkanian,4 9 these cases demonstrate the Rehnquist
model's weakening hold on the Court. Four Justices dissented and
would have found state action in each case. In addition to Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, Justices O'Connor and Blackmun found state action
in San Francisco Arts & Athletics under the joint participation theory.45 °
Likewise, in Tarkanian, Justices O'Connor and White joined with Jus-
tices Marshall and Brennan to find that the activities of the NCAA were
state action under the joint participation theory.451  Although the
O'Connor model did not command a majority of the Court in either San
Francisco Arts & Athletics or Tarkanian, together the cases reveal that
five Justices accept the O'Connor model and are willing to find state ac-
tion on the basis of the model's more liberal joint participation theory.452
Although Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope453 is
not a standard state action case, it demonstrates further erosion in the
Rehnquist model's command of the Court. Using analysis similar to the
joint participation theory, eight Justices rejected Justice Rehnquist's
analysis. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice
Rehnquist that the running of a statute of limitation is not "sufficient to
implicate due process. '4 54 Yet she identified the* issue in the case as
whether "the State's involvement in the nonclaim statute is substantial
enough to implicate the Due Process Clause. 4155 Just as she and Justice
Brennan reviewed the relation between the USOC and the federal gov-
448. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
449. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
450. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 548 (O'Connor, J., joined by Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
451. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199-203 (White, J., dissenting). The issue in Tarkanian actu-
ally was whether the NCAA acted under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1981) rather than whether its conduct was state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The dissenters, however, did not distinguish the two issues and relied on state action
precedent.
452. See supra notes 300-03, 326-28 and accompanying text.
453. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
454. d at 485-86. This statement is troublesome. Justice O'Connor cannot mean that a
statute of limitation is not state action subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. Like any statute
duly enacted by the legislature, a statute of limitation must be state action. See supra note 60
and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor may mean that a statute of limitation does not of its
own self-executing operation violate due process. If so, she agrees with Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's view that the state is free to define the creditor's property interest in a cause of action
regardless of the values involved, See supra note 338.
455. Pope, 485 U.S. at 486.
ernment in San Francisco Arts & Athletics,4"6 she reviewed the relation
between the probate court and the operation of the nonclaim statute in
Pope.4" 7 She concluded that the probate court's "involvement [in the op-
eration of the nonclaim statute] is so pervasive and substantial that it
must be considered state action subject to the restrictions of the Four-
teenth Amendment." '458 In other words, the probate court's "involve-
ment" in the running of the statute made it a joint participant in the
statute's deprivation of the plaintiff creditor's cause of action. The plain-
tiff was thus entitled to personal notice of the court's proceedings.4"9
These cases indicate that Chief Justice Rehnquist may be alone in
fully embracing the restrictive model of state action he constructed dur-
ing the Burger Court years. The solid majority of six that the Rehnquist
model commanded on the Burger Court is clearly gone. Although the
expansive Marshall model continues to appeal only to Justice Marshall,
the O'Connor model is gaining wide support on the Court. The
O'Connor model, which generally follows the Rehnquist model's restric-
tive approach, adds a liberal joint participation theory of state action.
Although the Justices vary in their application of the O'Connor model's
joint participation theory,460 these cases demonstrate the willingness of
these Justices to examine all of the ties between the state and the cause of
a particular deprivation to determine if the state is a joint participant in
the deprivation, thus implicating the Due Process Clause. To that ex-
tent, these cases reflect a definite movement away from the restrictive
Rehnquist model of the state action doctrine.461
456. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). For a discussion of San Francisco Arts & Athletics and Justices
O'Connor's and Brennan's analysis of the case, see supra notes 270-303 and accompanying
text. Justices O'Connor and Brennan examined the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the USOC to determine if the federal government was sufficiently involved in the
challenged decision of the USOC to treat the decision as state action.
457. Pope, 485 U.S. at 487-88.
458. Id. at 487 (Justice O'Connor's analysis on this issue is discussed supra at notes 332-37
and accompanying text). This sentence too is troublesome. It would be a striking conclusion
indeed if the actions of a state probate court were not state action subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice O'Connor presumably means that the probate court and its proceedings
caused the deprivation of the plaintiff creditor's cause of action because of the court's "involve-
ment" in the running of the statute.
459. See supra notes 336-37 and accompanying text.
460. Justice Blackmun, for example, would have found the state to be a joint participant in
San Francisco Arts & Athletics but not in Tarkanian. See supra notes 300, 312. Justice White
would have reached the opposite results in both cases. See supra notes 277, 326. Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Stevens found the requisite state involvement only in Pope. See supra
notes 277, 312, 332-37 and accompanying text.
461. Although the appointment of Justice Souter to replace Justice Brennan undoubtedly
will impact this movement, the nature and extent of Justice Souter's impact is impossible to
predict. Justice Souter's opinions on the court of appeals and his earlier writing provide no
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V. Conclusion
The Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement serves to
contain federal judicial power and the application of constitutional stan-
dards of behavior in the boundaries set by the Constitution.462 The Con-
stitution does not regulate private conduct," 3 and it affords federal
courts only narrowly confined power to articulate positive law regulating
private conduct.' 6 The state action requirement prevents federal courts
from directly regulating private activities in the guise of enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment, when the Constitution intended the representa-
tive branches-of both state and federal governments-to have exclusive
authority to regulate private activities." 5
The state action theories create exceptions to the general operation
of the state action requirement and the general scheme of the Constitu-
tion. They allow the federal courts to apply fourteenth amendment re-
strictions to ostensibly private conduct based on the government's
involvement in the conduct or the governmental nature of the con-
duct."6 They do so for a sound reason: to assure that governments do
not circumvent fourteenth amendment restrictions by acting with or
through private entities. The application of the state action theories
nonetheless results in the federal courts directly regulating private con-
duct, something the Constitution ordinarily leaves for the representative
insight into his views on state action issues. One of course would not expect Justice Souter to
find state action as liberally as Justice Brennan did, see supra notes 382-86, but a more precise
prediction would be impossible to substantiate. After all, one would not have expected Presi-
dent Reagan's appointees to relax the state action doctrine. See supra notes 445-60 and accom-
panying text.
A state action case that is currently pending before the Court, Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990), should give
some indication of Justice Souter's impact on the state action issue. The issue in that case is
whether the ruling in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1988), applies to civil trials between
private litigants. Batson held that a government prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to
exclude jurors on the basis of race violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In Edmonson, the
Court apparently must decide whether a private litigant's use of peremptory challenges in a
civil trial is state action such that it violates the Amendment. For a discussion of this state
action issue see Edmonson, 860 F.2d 1308 (held private litigant's discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges is state action that violates the Fourteenth Amendment), rev'd on reh'g en
banc, 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (found no state action); Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (1 lth
Cir. 1989) (found state action); Thomas v. Diversified Contractors, Inc., 551 So. 2d 343 (Ala.
1989) (found state action); Wright, Litigating the State Action Issue in Peremptory Challenge
Cases, 13 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 573 (1989).
462. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
464. See supra note 37.
465. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 39-267 for discussion of these theories.
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branches of government to regulate. 467 Moreover, the Supreme Court's
rulings under these theories are final because they are based on the Con-
stitution. The state action theories through which the Court applies the
Fourteenth Amendment to private conduct are thus a powerful and po-
tentially dangerous departure from the Constitution's usual allocation of
governmental power.
The Court must constantly maintain tight control over the state ac-
tion theories to prevent their use to usurp the regulatory power over pri-
vate conduct that the Constitution vested in representative political
bodies. The judiciary may be greatly tempted to use these theories to
regulate private conduct when the states and Congress have failed to do
so or have done so in a manner that the courts consider imprudent or
misguided. When the Constitution leaves these matters to the political
branches of government, however, the Court must not intervene based on
its disagreement with those branches' decisions. A law regulating or de-
clining to regulate private activity is not unconstitutional just because it
is a bad law. Loosely formulated and liberally applied state action theo-
ries are susceptible to such an inappropriate use not only by the Supreme
Court,468 but more importantly, by the lower federal courts following the
Court's lead.469
The Rehnquist model of the state action doctrine, therefore, is well
designed to serve the purposes and policies underlying the state action
requirement. It recognizes that the state acts through and with private
entities to achieve governmental objectives. The Rehnquist model ac-
cepts the state action theories as devices to assure compliance with the
Fourteenth Amendment in such circumstances. The Rehnquist model,
however, strictly limits the theories to assure that courts use the Four-
teenth Amendment to control governmental action only, leaving the
political branches to regulate private activities and relationships as the
Constitution intended.
The Rehnquist model is nonetheless too restrictive because it fails to
apply fourteenth amendment restraints to some actions and decisions
that clearly are attributable to the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion for the Court in Blum v. Yaretsky47° is a good example of this failure.
In Blum, the state directed and encouraged the private entities to make
467. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
468. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
469. See, e.g., Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989); Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
crete Co., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd on reh'g en banc, 895 F.2d 218 (1990), cert
granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990); Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 521 F.2d 344 (5th Cir.
1975), rev'd on reh'g en banc, 530 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1976).
470. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
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transfer decisions that served the state function of determining the level
of public assistance each citizen received.47 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment's purpose to protect individuals from arbitrary governmental con-
duct should apply to such a decision, 472 even if the state delegates to a
private entity the authority to make the final determination.473
While the Rehnquist model in most respects faithfully serves the
purposes and values underlying the state action doctrine and the Four-
teenth Amendment, then, it is too restrictive. Justice O'Connor's model
loosens the state action doctrine to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to
more ostensibly private conduct than the Rehnquist model allows.
While the O'Connor model seeks a justified end, its choice of the joint
participation theory to effect the desired expansion of state action is
problematic.
The joint participation or symbiosis theory of state action lacks use-
able standards to guide future cases and provide consistent results. The
theory has been criticized since its inception because the basis for finding
state action under the theory has never been explained clearly. Justice
Harlan criticized the Court's creation of the theory in Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority.474 He wrote:
The Court's opinion, by a process of first undiscriminatingly
throwing together various factual bits and pieces and then under-
mining the resulting structure by an equally vague disclaimer,
seems to me to leave completely at sea just what it is in this record
that satisfies the requirement of "state action."475
Indeed, when courts use the joint participation theory, they list all the
ties between the government and the private entity's challenged conduct
and then announce the entity's conduct to be state action, proclaiming
the state a joint participant in the private entity's operations.476 Such an
approach provides little more guidance than saying that the private en-
tity's conduct is state action because it ought to be deemed state action.
The Court has never articulated precisely what relationship between the
state and the private entity is required for this conclusion and why those
471. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1026 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra notes 177-85, 205-15, 381
and accompanying text.
472. Finding that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the private entity's decision does
not necessarily mean the decision in fact was arbitrary and violative of the Amendment.
Rather, the court is merely required to review the decision to determine whether it was so
arbitrary as to violate due process.
473. See supra note 467 and accompanying text.
474. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
475. Id. at 728 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
476. Id. at 722-24; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988),
rev'd on reh'g en banc, 895 F.2d 218, cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
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relationships justify application of the Fourteenth Amendment to a pri-
vate entity. By "sifting facts and weighing the circumstances," there-
fore, a court can list the unique ties between the state and any private
actor and then hold arbitrarily that the actor's conduct is or is not state
action.4 77 The joint participation theory therefore fails to provide any
"neutral theory of constitutional law"47" that might serve as a guide in
future cases involving different facts and relationships. It neither guides
courts in applying the Fourteenth Amendment to governments' efforts to
act with or through private entities nor prevents courts from intruding
upon the political branches' exclusive authority to regulate private
activity.
Three Justices' application of the joint participation theory in recent
state action cases demonstrates this theory's unpredictability. Justice
O'Connor, for example, found sufficient ties to deem the federal govern-
ment a joint participant in the USOC's licensing decision in San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,479 but
she held that the state of New York was not a joint participant in the
nursing homes' transfer decisions in Blum v. Yaretsky. 8 ° Blum, how-
ever, was a better case for the theory's application than San Francisco
Arts & Athletics.48 '
The positions of Justices White and Blackmun in Blum, San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, and NCAA v. Tarkanian 4 2 further demonstrate
the difficulty of applying the joint participation theory. Justice Black-
477. See McCoy, supra note 72, at 809 n.98 (" 'Symbiosis' is such an open-ended notion
that it seems to place little or no restraint on the judge's ability to assert that the facts of a
particular case do or do not add up to 'symbiosis' with the state."); ef R. ROTUNDA, J. No-
WAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 183 (The "symbiotic relationship" category of state action
cases "is, in reality, a 'catch-all' which may have little, if any, substantive meaning.").
478. Wechsler, supra note 86, at 1. Writing in 1959, Professor Wechsler did not use the
quoted phrase in discussing Burton. The phrase comes from the title of his paper delivered as
the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School in 1959 that, among other
things, criticized several Supreme Court decisions for failing to apply "neutral principles of
constitutional law." The state action case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), was
among the decisions Professor Wechsler criticized on this ground. See Wechsler, supra note
86, at 1, 29-31.
479. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
480. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
481. The nursing homes in Blum made the challenged transfer decisions entirely at the
insistence of the state and entirely for the state's direct benefit. See supra notes 177-85, 205-15,
381 and accompanying text. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, on the other hand, the govern-
ment did not regulate the USOC's licensing decisions in any way, and the challenged decision
only remotely inured to the government's benefit. See supra notes 288-91 and accompanying
text. For discussions of the joint participation theory as applied to Blum and San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, see supra notes 205-15, 288-91, 300-03 and accompanying text.
482. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
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mun found state action in San Francisco Arts & Athletics but not in
Tarkanian. Justice White, meanwhile, found state action in Tarkanian
but not in San Francisco Arts & Athletics.
Justice Harlan's criticism of the joint participation theory is thus
justified. The theory lacks standards to guide decisions and does not
stand on as solid a theoretical foundation as the other theories. Its use to
expand the restrictive Rehnquist model is ill advised.
A better approach to correct the overly restrictive Rehnquist model
is to employ a carefully expanded variant of the government function
theory. The Court originally used the government function theory in
Marsh v. Alabama483 to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to the activi-
ties of a private entity that had voluntarily assumed a governmental role
and displaced the government in some capacity.484 The restrictive ver-
sion of the government function theory devised by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist is well-suited for that kind of case.
As applied to a case like Marsh, the government function theory
must be narrow, and the strict exclusivity requirements485 formulated by
Chief Justice Rehnquist are justified. The Court's application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to a private entity in cases like Marsh comes
closer to usurping the power of the representative branches of govern-
ment than any other state action theory. Although the Constitution does
not regulate directly or empower the federal courts to regulate directly a
private corporation's activities,486 the Marsh Court's application of the
Fourteenth Amendment did just that. It applies the Constitution di-
rectly to the activities of a private entity entirely on the basis of the en-
tity's own conduct. This power to sidestep the Constitution's preference
that controlled majoritarian government-instead of federal courts-reg-
ulate private conduct must be limited.
The justification for the Court possessing and using that power is
that the private entity, like the one in Marsh, essentially has become the
government and, like all American governments, must conform its ac-
tions to fourteenth amendment restraints. A private entity "becomes" a
government only when it performs a function that only governments per-
form and it is the only entity-governmental or otherwise-performing
the function. The theory's justification breaks down if it is applied to
functions that governments sometimes perform and sometimes leave to
483. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
484. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
485. For a discussion of these exclusivity requirements, see supra notes 244-61 and accom-
panying text.
486. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
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the marketplace or to functions that are simultaneously provided by sev-
eral entities. Chief Justice Rehnquist's exclusivity requirements thus pre-
vent the Court from usurping the exclusive authority of the
representative governmental bodies to regulate private conduct.
Those strict exclusivity requirements, however, serve no purpose
when applied to a private entity's performance of a governmental func-
tion pursuant to express or implied state delegation. When the state ex-
pressly or perhaps impliedly authorizes or requires a private entity to act,
at least minimal state involvement exists and the danger of the courts
usurping representative authority over purely private conduct is less pro-
nounced. The Court's decision to apply constitutional standards then
depends not on the nature of the private conduct alone, but also on the
state's delegation of authority. In such cases, it should be sufficient that
the function is one ordinarily performed by the state-rather than one
exclusively performed by the state.4" 7 If the state affirmatively delegates
a function to a private entity, strict application of the exclusivity require-
ments prevents application of the Fourteenth Amendment to decisions
and actions for which the state is directly responsible. When the state
expressly488 delegates the performance of a typically governmental func-
tion to a private entity, the state should not be free from responsibility for
the manner in which the function is performed simply because the func-
tion is not one "exclusively" performed by government.
The Court should recognize a separate "delegation" variant of the
government function theory. Applying this modified approach, the
Court should apply the Fourteenth Amendment to actions of private en-
tities when the actions are governmental in nature and are performed
pursuant to express governmental directive or delegation. Courts should
balance these two requirements in determining whether the Amendment
applies. The more clearly the plaintiff's conduct constitutes a true gov-
ernment function, the less explicit and detailed the government "delega-
tion" needs to be. Likewise, when the government "delegation" is a
directive guided by detailed regulations, the function the private entity
performs need not be so clearly a true "exclusively" governmental func-
tion. Although these standards do not provide absolute certainty and
predictability, they provide substantially more guidance than the joint
participation theory. Moreover, unlike the joint participation theory,
487. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 548-59 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
488. "Express" delegation means that the state expressly requires or authorizes a private
entity to perform a particular function. It does not mean that the state explicitly recognizes
that the function is governmental in nature.
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their formulation is grounded in the purposes underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment's state action requirement and the need for theories that al-
low ostensibly private conduct to fall subject to fourteenth amendment
restraints.
